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A competition case typically involves two phases-a decision on the
merits, and a decision on the remedy. These phases are of equal
importance. Both must be resolved satisfactorily before a lawsuit will
achieve a practical effect on consumer welfare. The Supreme Court has
underscored this point on a number of occasions:
The proper disposition of antitrust cases is obviously of great public
importance, and their remedial phase, more often than not, is crucial. For the
suit has been a futile exercise if the Government proves a violation but fails to
secure a remedy adequate to redress it. "A public interest served by such civil
suits is that they effectively pry open to competition a market that has been
closed by defendants' illegal restraints. If the decree accomplishes less than
that, the Government has won a lawsuit and lost a cause."
In designing effective relief the Federal Trade Commission (Commis-
sion) can choose from either of two general approaches. It may adopt
either conduct remedies or structural remedies. The first of these types-
the conduct remedies-are primarily injunctive in nature. They identify
specific practices that have violated the antitrust laws, forbid their
repetition, and enforce the order with the threat of an action for contempt.
Conduct remedies tend to be limited and safe. Common examples of such
relief include injunctions against the use of territorial restraints, exclusive-
dealing contracts, or price-fixing. Structural relief, on the other hand,
deals with these kinds of problems in an entirely different way. Rather than
forbidding certain types of behavior directly, it instead alters the
organizational form of an industry through such devices as divestiture or
the breakup of a single firm into separate and independent competing
entities.2 These changes are intended to increase the number of actors in a
given industry, so that competitive processes will improve the industry's
performance and will make specific conduct injunctions unnecessary.
Structural relief is more sweeping than a conduct order but holds out the
promise of correspondingly more effective results.3
Despite some apparently attractive features, however, structural
remedies have thus far not been used with great frequency. The reasons for
this judicial hesitancy are not hard to find. The antitrust statutes do not
preclude structural relief, but neither do they authorize it with the kind of
clarity and precision that would assure ajudge he is doing the proper thing.
This is particularly true of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act).
I. United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 323-24 (1961), quoting
International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392,401 (1947). See also Gilbertville Trucking Co. v.
United States, 371 U.S. 115, 130 (1962).
2. Structural relief can be understood as including the divestiture of certain legal rights as well as
of entire organizational units. Thus, compulsory patent or trademark licensing, for example, might be
defined as forms of structural relief. This option will be briefly discussed below, but it is generally
outside the scope of this article. The principal focus will be on the remedies that directly affect
corporate organization.
3. For a background discussion of the subject, see Oppenheim, Divestiture as a Remedy Under
the Federal Antitrust Laws (Economic Background), 19 GEo. WAstI. L. Rev. 119 (1950).
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The remedial provisions of section 5 of that Act, like the substantive ones,
are brief and general:
If upon such hearing the Commission shall be of the opinion that the method
of competition . . . in question is prohibited by . . . this subchapter, it
shall make a report in writing in which it shall state its findings as to the facts
and shall issue . an order requiring such persons, partnership, or
corporation to cease and desist from using such method of com-
petition . . ..
It will be observed that the Commission's remedial authority is framed
solely in terms of a power to issue "cease and desist" orders. This
formulation tends to create two obstacles to the use of structural remedies.
First, the language most naturally suggests reliance on conduct injunctions
as at least the preferred form of remedy. Second, the language gives no
guidance with respect to the proper form of whatever structural remedies
might be called for and, by introducing this uncertainty, tends to
discourage their use.
In combination these difficulties mean that the role of structural relief
must be determined from a review of the case law and its associated
literature, rather than being ascertainable directly from the statute. This
article is intended to present such a review. Its discussion will be divided
into seven principal sections. The first four of these examine the current
status of the law: The first section takes up the threshold question that was
alluded to above, and asks whether section 5's reference to "cease and
desist" orders will authorize the use of structural remedies at all. It
concludes that such remedies are permissible. The second section then
reviews the case law and identifies the specific economic and business
circumstances in which structural remedies have been held to be
appropriate. This review is confined to established law and does not
attempt to formulate new theories. The third section examines the
circumstances in which structural relief has been held to be inappropriate.
The final pages of this section attempt to harmonize the various cases
holding for and against structural relief. The fourth section makes a brief
historical detour, examining one unarticulated reason for the relative
paucity of structural cases. It suggests that courts have, to an unwarranted
degree, tended to think of corporations as legal "persons," endowed in the
same manner as individuals with the right to continued and undisturbed
existence.
The remaining sections of the paper consider possible extensions and
refinements of the law: The fifth section takes up the basic policy question
of whether a wider use of structural remedies would be desirable. This
discussion focuses primarily on the economic literature and considers
whether important business efficiencies would be lost as a result of a
deconcentration policy. The discussion summarizes the major arguments
4. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (Supp. 11977).
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that have been made on this issue, but, due to their complexity, does not
attempt to resolve them. Assuming that some further use of structural
relief appears desirable, the sixth section then examines one theory by
which such an extension can be made. It begins by identifying new
structural theories of liability, such as the no-fault and certain
exclusionary-practice approaches, and then suggests that only a structural
remedy could address the essential elements of those offenses. In
connection with this inquiry it considers whether structural theories of
liability can properly be reached under section 5's prohibition against
unfair "methods" of competition. Finally, the seventh section considers a
somewhat more complicated set of theories. These relate to the use of
structural remedies, rather than conduct remedies, in correcting certain
types of violations that had turned solely on improper conduct. Such an
approach is based on the theory that conduct remedies would be too easily
evaded in at least the context of oligopolistic industries.
I. ARE STRUCTURAL REMEDIES AUTHORIZED UNDER SECTION 5?
The threshold question is in some senses the most difficult one of all.
That question is whether section 5, by authorizing the Commission to issue
"cease and desist" orders, also implicitly authorizes -the use of structural
remedies in any form. It is neither intuitively nor linguistically obvious that
it does, and the original legislative history provides little support for such a
construction. Nevertheless, the subsequent case law has clearly established
the Commission's authority to impose divestiture and other affirmative
requirements. This position was not reached at once. It emerged instead
over a period of years, in response to a growing recognition that Congress
must have intended to entrust regulatory agencies with the power
necessary to achieve their congressionally-mandated objectives.
A. Legislative History
This outcome was not made explicit by the initial floor debates on
section 5. Those debates are generally lacking in any discussion of the
Commission's remedial powers. The principal concern of Congress was the
definition and the substantive reach of the prohibition against "unfair
methods of competition," rather than the corrective actions that might
ultimately be taken. To the extent that the Commission's remedial powers
were alluded to, however, they were described in terms that went no further
than the letter of the statute.
Thus those powers were described in words that were essentially
paraphrases of "cease and desist." Senator Newlands, the principal
sponsor of the FTC Act, described the agency's procedures in the following
way:
Unfair competition is made unlawful, and the Commission is authorized,
when any case of unfair practice or unfair method is brought to its attention,
[Vol, 40:779
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to summon the party charged and to have a hearing, and if it decides that the
practice or method is unfair, to issue an order compelling its discon-
5tinuance ....
Senator Sutherland, one of the leading opponents of the bill, described its
operation in similar terms:
[U]nder this proposed bill when the Commission determines that unfair
competition or unfair methods of competition exist it issues an order which,
in form, is an injunction, a thing which only a court can issue; and if that is not
obeyed by the corporation enjoined, application is made to the court, and
that court, so far as this bill is concerned, in a perfectly perfunctory manner,
itself issues a real injunction . . . . If the order of the Commission has not
been complied with, the Court is authorized to issue a real injunction, and
that is all there is to it. . . . The trade commission, if it acts under that clause
[section 5], is not making a rule or a law within this primary standard, but it is
declaring when it acts that somebody has violated the law, and it is proceeding
to render judgment that the violator shall be restrained and enjoined from
those acts which constitute a violation of the law.6
Senator Works, another opponent of the bill, stated that it would give the
agency the power "to try the question whether a corporation or association
has been guilty of what it has determined to be unfair competition, and
render a decree, or an order in the nature of a decree of injunction,
forbidding the corporation to continue the practice. 7
Not only did the legislators omit all reference to divestiture powers in
section 5, but they may have adopted an economic rationale for the FTC
Act that would have made such powers unnecessary. The final report of the
House Conference Committee, for example, contained the following
explanation: "It is now generally recognized that the only effective means
of establishing and maintaining monopoly, where there is no control of a
natural resource as [or?] of transportation, is the use of unfair competition.
The most certain way to stop monopoly at the threshold is to prevent
unfair competition."s If monopoly cannot be maintained in the absence of
improper conduct, in other words, then conduct injunctions will be
sufficient to cure any problems that are identified, and the more innovative
structural remedies would not have to be considered.
One Senator went somewhat further than this. He not only omitted all
reference to divestiture powers, but expressly questioned their existence:
5. 51 CONG. REc. 11084 (1914) (remarks of Sen. Newlands).
6. Id. at 12815 (1914) (remarks of Sen. Sutherland). The context of these remarks reduces their
force to some extent. Senator Sutherland was primarily concerned about the uncertainty of § 5 and its
lack of clear substantive standards, and feared that judicial review would not provide an adequate
safeguard against abuse if the courts were directed to enforce Commission orders automatically. See id.
at 12816 (1914) (remarks of Sen. Sutherland). Still, it seems significant that he expressed this concern
only by reference to situations concerning simple injunctions.
7. Id. at 12276 t1914) (remarks of Sen. Works). See also id. at 12147, 12149 (1914) (remarks of
Sen. Hollis).
8. H. R. CONF. REP. No. 1142, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 18-19 (1914), reprinted in 51 Co.c;. Re.
14924 (1914). See also 51 CONG. REc. 11455 (1914) (remarks of Sen. Cummins). This point isdeveloped
in greater detail in the text accompanying notes 249-54 infra.
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What does the Senator from Nevada [Mr. Newlands] propose to do with this
bill? What is the trust remedy he proposes? Why, as I said a moment ago, it is
only to nibble at one side of the trust. It is simply to reach the matter of unfair
competition. Suppress that, and you have accomplished the whole thing,
according to the idea of the Senator from Nevada. You still leave the
monopoly; you still leave it in all force and power, as it has been able to form
itself under the corporation laws of the several States. All you can do, taking
all that is claimed for Section 5, is that you can suppress unfair competition;
but in all other respects the octopus, the monopoly, remains a living being to
plague the American people.9
It is not wholly clear how much weight should be given to these remarks.
Senator Nelson was not one of the main participants in the debates on the
FTC Act, and so may not have been particularly knowledgeable about its
purposes. Although his remarks were consistent with the view of some
legislators that the Justice Department and the FTC should exercise
complementary functions,10 they were inconsistent with the alternative
viewpoint that the FTC should have jurisdiction over all trade offenses," t
and they would have created such a degree ofjurisdictional confusion that
the Supreme Court has since concluded that this could not have been the
legislative intent.
1 2
None of these passages-with the possible exception of Senator
Nelson's comments-purported to give a comprehensive description of the
Commission's remedial powers. Thus, by omitting all reference to
structural relief, Congress did not necessarily foreclose the possibility of it.
It is still noteworthy, however, that none of the speakers saw fit to mention
that possibility in express terms. At the very least this would indicate that
divestiture remedies did not loom particularly large in the minds of the
bill's sponsors.
This omission is particularly striking inasmuch as Congress was able
to confer divestiture powers with great particularity when it wished to do
so. Two unsuccessful amendments to the House version of the FTC Act
would have done precisely that. 3 Section 11 of the Clayton Act, moreover,
9. Id. at 12031 (remarks of Sen. Nelson). See also id. at 11597 (remarks of Sen. Borah).
10. See, e.g., 51 CONG. REc. 12129 (1914) (remarks of Sen. Newlands).
11. Id. at 11112 (1914) (remarks of Sen. Newlands).
12. See FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (1948) ("We can conceive of no greater obstacle
this Court could create to the fulfillment of these congressional purposes than to inject into every Trade
Commission proceeding brought under § 5 and into every Sherman Act suit brought by the Justice
Department a possible jurisdictional question." Id. at 693).
13. A substitute bill introduced by Congressman Murdock (H.R. 9301) would have authorized
the Commission to issue an order to a monopolizing corporation "specifying such changes in tile
concern as would promptly terminate that monopolistic power." Id. at 8978 (remarks of Rep,
Murdock). An amendment to the House bill proposed by Congressman Lafferty would have
authorized the Commission to "issue and serve upon such corporation or association a written
order ... specifying such changes in the organization, conduct, or management of its property and
business as in the opinion of the commission will most effectively and promptly terminate such
monopolistic power .... H.R. REP. No. 533, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., Part 3, app. 20 (1914). This fail-
ure of both these amendments is significant but not dispositive of the question of the existence of
divestiture powers in § 5. Both were introduced at a time when the House bill contemplated a Com-
mission with powers limited to those of investigation and publicity, rather than one possessing
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which was enacted less than three weeks after the FTC Act,' 4 also contains
explicit terms relating to divestiture. It provides that after proof of certain
Clayton Act violations, including unlawful stock acquisitions as defined by
section 7, the Commission is to order the offending corporation "to cease
and desist from such violation and to divest itself of the stock [acquired in
violation of section 7]."15 More modern statutes are often equally explicit.
Thus, for example, in the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935,
Congress directed the Securities and Exchange Commission to order
certain divestitures of utility holding companies. This was accomplished
not by utilization of cease and desist language, but rather by granting the
broader power "to take such action as the Commission shall find necessary
to limit the operations of the holding-company system . . . to a single
integrated public-utility system ... ,,6
There is, however, a plausible explanation for the failure to refer
specifically to divestiture powers in section 5. Under the jurisprudence of
1914, it appeared that monopolies could be broken up using statutes that
did not specifically name that remedy. The Sherman Act, for example,
empowered courts only to "prevent and restrain" violations.1 7 Yet by the
time the FTC Act was passed, divestiture was an established remedy under
this statute. Seven monopolies had already been broken up. 8 Congress
may therefore have concluded that cease and desist orders were wholly
sufficient to deal with the monopoly problem. Orders under that kind of
language had, in fact, and as a practical matter, brought divestitures ab out.
Why then did Congress spell out the divestiture remedy in the Clayton
Act, when it failed to do so in section 5? This may be attributable to
nothing more than the different scope of the two statutes. Section 7 of the
substantive authority of any kind. See 51 CoNG. REC. 8980 (1914) (remarks of Rep. TalcotO; id. at
8985 (remarks of Rep. Montague). Since the amendments thus departed radically from the bill then
under consideration, it is easy to see why they were rejected. It does not follow that they would have
been rejected after the House had accepted the substantive terms of§ 5. Moreover, at least in the case of
Congressman Murdock, the proposal represented a policy ofthe insurgent Progressive Party that may
have been voted down by members of the two established parties precisely because of its origins.
14. Because of the temporal proximity of these two statutes, and their closely related purposes, it
has frequently been held that they should be construed in pari materia. See, e.g., United States v.
American Building Maintenance Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 277 (1975); FTC v. Reed, 243 F.2d 308, 309
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 823 (1957).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 21(b) (1976). On the other hand, two considerations tend to diminish the
significance of this comparison. First, divestiture is the natural remedy in the case of improper
acquisitions, and so can be specified with some confidence, whereas it would be appropriate only for
some § 5 violations and thus need not be particularly named. Second, the Clayton and FTCActs wre
drafted in different committees of Congress, and so their divergent wording may reflect only the styles
of different authors rather than a substantive difference of intent. For a general description of the
origins of these bills, see A. STONE, ECONO.tC REGULATION AND THE PUBLIC INal T47-51 (1977).
For a general discussion of the Commission's divestiture powers under § 7 of the Clayton Act, see
Dougherty & Davidson, Limitation Without Regulation: The Federal Trade Commission Staff
Approach to Conglomerate Merger, 1980 UTAH L. REv. .
16. 15 U.S.C. § 79k (b) (I) (Supp. 11977). This statute, however, like the Clayton Act, might be
distinguished as one that contemplates divestiture as the presumptive remedy.
17. 15 U.S.C. § 4 (Supp. 11977).
18. These are enumerated in REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CoiusTrEE TO STUDY TIlE
ANrrusr LAws 353-57 (1955).
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Clayton Act is specific, and deals only with mergers. Divestiture is the
obvious remedy for an improper merger and so it can be specified in the
statute with reasonable confidence. Section 5, on the other hand, prohibits
a wide range of improper conduct. Different forms of unfair competition
will call for widely different remedies and so it would not have been
practical to specify any one of them in the statute. The remedial powers of
the Commission would have to have a flexibility comparable to that found
in its substantive powers.
B. Judicial Interpretations
It is against this background that the question of the Commission's
power to order structural relief was presented to the courts. The first
attempt was not propitious. That occurred in the case of FTC v. Eastman
Kodak Co. 19 In that case the Commission had sued the company to
challenge the anticompetitive acquisition of three film-processing plants.
The challenge was brought under section 5, rather than under section 7 of
the Clayton Act, because at that time section 7 did not apply to the
acquisition of assets.20 The Supreme Court held, however, that section 5
contained no divestiture powers:
The proceeding before the Commission was instituted under § 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, and its authority did not go beyond the
provisions of that section. By these the Commission is empowered to prevent
the using of "unfair methods of competition" in interstate and foreign
commerce, and, if it finds that "any unfair method of competition" is being
used, to issue an order requiring the offender "to cease and desist from using
such method of competition." The Commission exercises only the
administrative functions delegated to it by the Act, notjudicial powers. It has
not been delegated the authority of a court of equity . . . . So here the
Commission had no authority to require that the company divest itself of the
ownership of the laboratories which it had acquired prior to any action by the
Commission. If the ownership or maintenance of these laboratories has
produced any unlawful status, the remedy must be administered by the courts
in appropriate proceedings therein instituted.21
The Supreme Court had held, in short, that the "cease and desist"
authority did not confer the kind of equitable powers that were required
for structural relief.
Matters remained in this posture for the next thirty-five years. The
Commission evidently accepted the Supreme Court's interpretation, and
thereafter conducted its affairs on the assumption that it had no divestiture
powers under section 5. Indeed, on a number of occasions the agency
expressly recognized this limitation on its authority.2"
19. 274 U.S. 619 (1927).
20. This had been established the previous term in FTC v. Western Meat Co., 272 U.S. 554
(1926).
21. 274 U.S. at 623 (citations omitted).
22. See, e.g., [1927] FTC ANN. REP. 67.
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The Kodak decision has now been abandoned, however. The change
to a new perspective began as early as the 1941 decision in NLRB v.
Express Publishing Co., 23 in which the Court held that "cease and desist"
powers could be used as the basis for flexible affirmative requirements. The
new perspective was then applied to certain corporate mergers in
Gilbertville Trucking Co. v. United States.24 That case arose when the
Interstate Commerce Commission investigated the relationships between
two motor carriers. It found that, while the carriers remained nominally
separate, they were so closely bound by informal family ties that they were
merged for all practical purposes. Such mergers were forbidden by section
5(4) of the Interstate Commerce Act. The Commission therefore ordered
divestiture, and the Supreme Court upheld the decision: "There is little
question that divestiture is within the scope of the Commission's power
since, with respect to a § 5(4) violation, it may order any party to'take such
action as may be necessary, in the opinion of the Commission, to prevent
continuance of such violation." 5 The ICC's authority "to prevent
continuance of such violation" amounts to much the same thing as section
5's authorization to issue "cease and desist" orders. In neither case does the
statutory language spell out an authority to order divestiture or to impose
other affirmative requirements, but the Court was willing to read this
power into the former statute. It seemed only a matter of time before a
similar construction was put on the latter.
Another step was taken early the following year, in Pan American
World Airways, Inc. v. United States (Panagra).26 In this case the Justice
Department had sued both Pan American and W. R. Grace & Co. It
charged that their joint operation of a subsidiary airline-Panagra-
constituted both a division of markets and an act of monopolization. The
Supreme Court ordered a dismissal of the complaint, holding that
supervision of airline routes and territories was entrusted exclusively to the
Civil Aeronautics Board.27 As part of its duties the CAB was to prevent
"unfair" competitive practices among carriers, including unfair horizontal
agreements. Since the agency was thus empowered to terminate the joint
venture if the public interest so required, the conventional antitrust laws
were to that extent displaced. In reaching this conclusion the Court had
first to determine that the CAB actually possessed effective divestiture
powers. It found little difficulty in doing so, despite the fact that the CAB's
28toh
authority, like that of the Federal Trade Commission, waslimitedtothe
issuance of cease and desist orders:
It is suggested that the power of the Board to issue a "cease and desist" order is
23. 312 U.S. 426 (1941).
24. 371 U.S. 115 (1962).
25. Id. at 129 (citation omitted).
26. 371 U.S. 296 (1963).
27. Id. at 309-10.
28. The analogy between the two regulatory statutes is even closer than this particular point or
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not broad enough to include the power to compel divestiture and that in any
event its power to do so under § 411 runs solely to air carriers, not to common
carriers or other stockholders. We do not read the Act so restrictively. The
Board has no power to award damages or to bring criminal prosecutions. Nor
does it, as already noted, have jurisdiction over every violation by air carriers.
But where the problem lies within the purview of the Board, as do questions of
division of territories, the allocation of routes, and the affiliation of common
carriers with air carriers, Congress must have intended to give it authority
that was ample to deal with the evil at hand.29
This language was clearly based upon a very different perspective of
the law from that which underlay the Kodak decision. Kodak had turned
on a conceptualized and academic distinction between statutory and
equitable authority, whereas Panagra was based on a more practical
recognition of the powers necessary to make an agency function
effectively. One might wonder why this change in outlook has come about.
It appears that the explanation lies in the changing canons of statutory
construction. In the 1920s, it was evidently the practice to give great weight
to the literal terms of the statute. By the 1960s, on the other hand, this
approach had come to appear stilted and artificial. The statutes seemed
best interpreted in light of the ultimate goals that Congress intended to
achieve. Subsidiary terms could then be construed in a manner that would
make the overall statutory scheme function more effectively. This method
of construction is in no sense manipulative. It is merely to say that
divestiture is sometimes the best means that the Commission will have for
discharging its broad substantive jurisdiction. Divestiture is the best means
of carrying out the congressional intent and, as a result, it presumably was
a part of the intent.
This approach to statutory construction is not limited to the FTC Act.
It is a basic tenet of administrative law in general. The Panagra Court was
well aware of that, and cited precedents drawn from throughout the field of
administrative law:
We have heretofore analogized the power of administrative agencies to
fashion appropriate relief to the power of courts to fashion Sherman Act
decrees. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Mandel Bros., 359 U.S. 385, 392-393.
Authority to mold administrative decrees is indeed like the authority of
courts to frame injunctive decrees (Labor Board v. Express Pub. Co., 312
U.S. 426,433,436; Labor Boardv. Cheney Lumber Co., 327 U.S. 385) subject
of course to judicial review. Dissolution of unlawful combinations, when
based on appropriate findings, is an historic remedy in the antitrust field, even
though not expressly authorized. United States v. Crescent Amusement Co.,
323 U.S. 173, 189. Likewise, the power to order divestiture need not be
overlap would suggest. The relevant section of the Federal Aviation Act was modeled directly on § 5 of
the FTC Act. It authorizes the CAB to prohibit "unfair or deceptive practices or unfair methods of
competition in air transporation or the sale thereof." Federal Aviation Act § 411, 49 U.S.C. § 1381
(Supp. I 1977). For this reason the Court noted that "[wie may profitably look to judicial
interpretation of§5as an aid in the resolution of . . . questions raised . . . under§41 V'"371 U.S. at
303, quoting American Airlines v. North Am. Airlines, 351 U.S. 79, 82 (1955).
29. 371 U.S. at 311-12.
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explicitly included in the powers of an administrative agency to be part of its
arsenal of authority, as we held only the other day in Gilbertville Trucking
Co. v. United States. Cf. Federal Trade Commission v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
274 U.S. 619. 31
While the Court did not expressly overrule the Kodak case, relegation of
the case to "Cf." status clearly pointed in that direction.
Since the Panagra decision was announced there have been a number
of attempts to construe it narrowly and restrict its scope.31 These efforts
have generally begun with the observation that the CAB enforces a
comprehensive regulatory scheme, one that governs many aspects of fares,
service, and other matters that would ordinarily be within the discretion of
individual businessmen. The FTC, by contrast, merely prohibits certain
business practices without specifically requiring others. In order to
implement its more comprehensive scheme, the CAB needs an equally
comprehensive set of remedies and sanctions, ranging from mild penalties
through full divestiture. Thus, the argument concludes, the differing roles
of the two agencies will require that their "cease and desist" powers be
construed in different ways.
This argument finds some support in the Panagra decision itself. The
Court was certainly aware of the regulatory context contemplated by the
Federal Aviation Act, and this awareness colors the entire opinion. At one
point, for example, the Court observed that the words "unfair methods of
competition," as used in that Act, "gather meaning from the context of that
particular regulatory measure and the type of competitive regime which it
visualizes. 32 At another point, more significantly, the regulatory context
was used to qualify the Court's basic holding on the existence of divestiture
power. "It seems clear that such power exists," the Court said, "at least
with respect to the particular problems involved in this case."
33
Upon closer examination, however, these passages do not appear to
affect the actual holding of the case. Both were dealing with collateral
matters. The first passage, which construed the CAB's powers over"unfair
methods of competition," was concerned with that agency's substantive
rather than its remedial powers. Those powers were obviously an integral
part of the regulatory scheme as a whole-and so had to be interpreted
with an eye on the other substantive provisions of the Federal Aviation
Act-but the remedial section stands alone and is affected by its context to
a far lesser extent. The second passage is still less relevant. The restriction
of the holding to the "particular problems" treated in the case should be
read in conjunction with the immediately preceding paragraph, in which
30. 371 U.S. at 312 n.17.
31. These efforts have most often been made by respondents to § 5 actions. Seealso P. AREEDA,
ANTrrRusT ANALYSIS 66 & n.189 (1974) (CAB's statutory mandate "exceeds the FTCs 'merely'
concurrent responsibility for the antitrust laws. 'Cease and desist' need not have same scope for
FTC and CAB").
32. 371 U.S. at 308.
33. Id. at 312.
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the Court had observed that the CAB did not have jurisdiction over all
possible antitrust violations.34 Some violations, such as those leading to
civil damages or criminal liability, would have to be prosecuted in other
forums. Thus the "particular problems" to which divestiture was limited
were those over which the CAB had jurisdiction in the first place, and not
merely those in which a particular type of regulatory environment was
imposed. As a result, the basic holding of Panagra would appear to stand
unimpaired. When an agency's charter includes the power to issue "cease
and desist orders," this grant also includes such other remedial powers as
may be necessary to enable the agency "to deal with the evil at hand. '"35
This broad reading of Panagra was confirmed by later cases. Two
Supreme Court decisions bear special mention, since they marked the
progressive erosion of the Kodak case. In the first of these, the Court
acknowledged the presence of contrary and possibly stronger authority.36
In the second case, the circle was finally closed-the Court observed tersely
that Kodak "has been repudiated." 3  Drawing on this developing
authority, the Commission has held in a number of its own decisions that it
possesses divestiture authority .under section 5.38
The cases discussed up until this point have been encouraging, but
they would be direct precedents for only a narrow range of factual
circumstances. All have concerned mergers, acquisitions, and the
divestiture of acquired assets. It might therefore be thought that the legal
34. Id. at 311-12.
35. Id. at 312.
36. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963). The Court's opinion reads in
part as follows:
In Federal Trade v. Eastman Kodak Co., 274 U.S. 619, the Court . . . held that the
Commission had no power to order divestiture in § 5 proceedings. But cf. Gilbertville
Trucking Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 115, 129-131; Pan American World Airways v.
United States, 371 U.S. 296, 312, and n.17.
Id. at 340 n.17. An earlier passage in this footnote has sometimes been read as casting some doubt on
the Panagra decision. There the Court referred to "Congress' evident refusal to confer upon the FTC
the ordinary powers of a court of equity . I..." d. at 339 n.17. For two reasons, however, this
language casts no doubts. First, the context makes it clear that the Court was referring to the FTCs
powers under the Clayton Act, rather than to its powers under § 5. Second, the lack of full equity
powers is still consistent with the existence of a power to order structural relief. An agency may have to
go to a court in order to enforce its subpoenas, or to have its final orders enforced, yet still be
empowered to order divestiture.
37. FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 600 n.4 (1966) (dictum). The footnote in Dean Foods
continued with the following remarks:
It [the Kodak decision] held that in fashioning a final decree the Commission "exercises only
the administrative functions delegated to it by the Act," and, therefore, could not order
divestiture of laboratories acquired through a stock purchase. This view was rejected in Pan
American . . . . the Court holding that "the power to order divestiture need not be explicitly
included in the powers of an administrative agency to be part of it; arsenal of authority,"
citing Gilbertville Trucking Co ...
38. See, e.g., Ash Grove Cement Co., [1975J TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 20,956, at 208 n.61
("power to order divestiture is . . . clear"); Golden Grain Macaroni Co., 78 F.T.C. 63, 178 (1971),
modified, 472 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 918 (1973); Beatrice Foods Co., 67 F.T.C.
473,726-27 (1965); Ekco Products, 65 F.T.C. 1163, 1213 (1964) ("T[he Commission has been given in
Section 5(b) a complete array of essentially equitable remedies, including divestiture and other
remedies designed to effect structural reorganization."), aff'd, 347 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1965),
STRUCTURAL REMEDIES
principle is in some way restricted to those circumstances. An order to
"cease and desist" from an improper acquisition might inevitably require
divestiture, for example, in a way that other forms of injunction would
neither require norjustify. Thus the power of structural relief under section
5 might be in reality quite limited.
A number of additional cases make it clear, however, that section 5
structural relief can be imposed in contexts other than mergers. In one such
case divestiture was ordered as a remedy to a monopolization charge,
despite the fact that a conduct order, although no doubt less effective,
could have addrdssed that situation.39
In another case a different form of structural relief-compulsory
patent licensing-was sustained as a remedy for the misuse of a drug
patent.40 And a wide variety of consumer-protection orders, which are also
based on section 5's "cease and desist" authority, have incorporated
affirmative requirements for corrective advertising.4' This last group of
cases do not relate to structural remedies, to be sure, but they confirm that
the "cease and desist" authority is not confined to the sort of negative
prohibition that a too literal reading of the statutory language might
suggest.
42
In addition, the Federal Trade Commission structural remedy may be
justified on the basis of a conservation of resources. It is certainly clear that
Congress intended for the Commission to investigate trade restraints that
might lead to monopoly. It is also clear that investigation of these matters
would discover some situations in which monopoly had already been
achieved. In those cases, Congress surely would intend for the Commission
to continue and to deal with the monopoly thus found, rather than
incurring the considerable inefficiency of transferring the matter to the
39. L.G. Balfour Co. v. FTC, 442 F.2d I (7th Cir. 1971). This was not a merger case despite the
fact that the divested subsidiary had once been acquired. The acquisition had taken place prior to that
period to which, by stipulation, the litigation was confined. It was the secret operation of this
subsidiary, i.e., its role in the monopolization, and not its acquisition, that violated § 5. See Id. at 19.
40. American Cyanamid v. FTC, 363 F.2d 757,772 (6th Cir. 1966). The Commission's order was
vacated and remanded on other grounds, however, and then modified. 72 F.T.C. 623 (1967), aff'dsub
nom. Chas. Pfizer & Co. v. FTC, 401 F.2d 574 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 920 (1969). See
also Luria Bros. & Co. v. FTC, 389 F.2d 847, 861,863 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 829 (1968) (sales
limitation a remedy for incipient monopolization).
41. See, e.g., Warner-Lambert, Inc. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct.
1575 (1978) (corrective advertising in Listerine commericials). See generally Note, "Corrective
Advertising" Orders of the Federal Trade Commission, 85 HAav. L. REv. 477 (1971).
42. One pair of cases tend to point in the opposite direction, however, if only weakly. In
Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223, 230-31 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (Burger, J.), the D.C. Circuit
enforced a divestiture order but refused to include in it a term ordering the divesture of after-acquired
assets. This was done apparently because the Commission failed to carry its burden of proof on the
necessity for including such assets. See text accompanying notes 146-55 infra. A few years later,
however, the Supreme Court intimated that the omission may have been due to some special limitation
on the FTC's jurisdiction instead. See Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562,573 n.8 (1972)
(Reynolds "concerned the enforcement powers of the Federal Trade Commission, not the equitable
powers of the District Court.") This in turn suggests that the Commission's remedies may be uniquely
limited to the restoration of the status quo ante, and that it cannot impose more expansive affirmative
requirements. Ultimately, however, it seems best not to make too much of this language in Ford. It is
merely a brief dictum, and it evidently misconstrued the nature of Reynolds as a burden-of-proofcase.
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Department of Justice, where the investigation would have to begin afresh.
The decided section 5 cases have not yet addressed all possible
theories of violation or all possible forms of structural remedy, but it is not
necessary that they do so. It was enough for them to have established that
structural relief is sometimes possible in a nonmerger action. As of that
moment the dam was broken, section 5 was freed from the constraints of its
literal terms, and the study of remedies under that statute merged with the
larger stream of jurisprudence on structural remedies in general.
Structural relief is as appropriate a remedy under section 5 as under
other statutes and, perhaps, is more appropriate. The next two sections of
this article will therefore review the general law of structural relief. The
following sections will then discuss changes or improvements that might be
made in the customary selection of remedies. Some of these changes could
be accomplished through application of existing general principles; others
might depend on the Commission's ability to use its special authority
under the FTC Act.
II. WHEN STRUCTURAL RELIEF HAS BEEN HELD APPROPRIATE
The courts have already recognized a number of circumstances in
which structural relief is appropriate. Those circumstances were first listed
with some precision in the motion-picture cases decided by the Supreme
Court in the late 1940s:
Divestiture or dissolution must take account of the present and future
conditions in the particular industry as well as past violations. It serves
several functions: (1) It puts an end to the combination or conspiracy when
that is itself the violation. (2) It deprives the antitrust defendants of the
benefits of their conspiracy. (3) It is designed to break up or render impotent
the monopoly power which violates the Act. 3
Later cases have modified this list and expanded upon it to some
extent.44 It now appears that structural relief will be authorized in five
types of situations: (1) when it directly undoes a single improper act
affecting the industry structure; (2) when it directly cures an essential
element of an antitrust offense; (3) when it deprives the respondents of
benefits they gained by their violations; (4) when it dismantles the
instrumentalities used in carrying out the violation; and (5) when it may
head off a demonstrated bent toward recidivism on the part of the
respondents. These five bases for structural relief will be discussed in
sequence.
43. Schine Chain Theaters, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 128-29 (1948). This passage has
been cited with approval by the Court on a number of subsequent occasions. See, e.g., International
Boxing Club v. United States, 358 U.S. 242, 253 (1959).
44. For a general discussion of structural relief, and the circumstances under which it has been




A. Structural Relief Used to Directly Undo Improper Actions
The first theory is the most straightforward and logically satisfying.
Structural relief is appropriate when it will directly undo a single, definable
act which improperly affects the industry structure. In that circumstance
structural relief is not merely "appropriate," but is the presumptive form of
remedy. When one wrongful act can be isolated, the contours of the
violation are relatively clear and the status quo ante can readily be
restored. Both mergers and the creation of holding-company monopolies
can be analyzed in these terms.
The most frequently encountered situation of this sort is the merger.
Mergers are single acts that affect, often adversely, an industry structure.
Many acquisitions are ultimately found to be anticompetitive in violation
of section 7 of the Clayton Act.45 In those circumstances divestiture is
almost invariably46 decreed. This principle is best illustrated by the
litigation concerning General Motors and the duPont Company.
4 7
The duPont case had its origins in the period 1917 through 1919.
During those years the company bought twenty-three percent of the stock
of General Motors. 48 Thereafter it maintained a number of common
officers with the automobile firm. There was some evidence that these
connections were used to influence GM in the direction of purchasing its
supplies from duPont.49 The circumstantial evidence of this was strongest
with respect to finishes and fabrics, for which duPont supplied sixty-seven
and fifty-two percent of GM's requirements, respectively, in the year
1946.50 These figures may not have been clear enough to establish the
existence of a present restraint on competition, but they at least
demonstrated a threat of preferential dealing with sufficient clarity to meet
the section 7 standard of a "reasonably probable" harm to competition.
DuPont's stock acquisition was therefore held to be unlawful.5
45. In one sense mergers are not an important part of our present problem, since the Clayton Act
expressly provides for the divestiture of unlawful acquisitions. See 15 U.S.C. § 21(b) (Supp. 11977).
Thus these matters can be handled without direct reliance upon the more general law of structural
remedies. On the other hand, the manner in which the courts have dealtwith the divestiture ofacquired
assets may shed some light on the principles that they will apply to structural cases of other kinds.
46. It is possible that the legal standard is even more stringent than this and will require a
divestiture order, at least in cases where the violation has been found by an administrative agency
rather than by a court. Section 11 of the Clayton Act states that the agency then "shall" issue an order
requiring divestiture. 15 U.S.C. § 21(b) (Supp. 1 1977). One district court has reported that
administrative agencies do not always construe this language as mandatory, however, see United States
v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 177 F. Supp. 1, 15 (N.D. Ill 1959), and the Supreme Court left this
question open on appeal. See 366 U.S. 316, 328 n.9 (1961).
47. See United States v. E.I. dePont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316 (1961).
48. The duPont case actually reached the Supreme Courttwice-once on appealconcerningthe
violation, and later concerning the remedy. Although it is the decision on the remedy that is of most
interest here, the facts of the case are more thoroughly set out in the first opinion. See United States v.
E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1956).
49. Id. at 603, 606-07 n.35.
50. Id. at 596.
51. Id. at 607. The Supreme Court may have adopted this basis for its decision only with some
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Once the basic unlawfulness of the acquisition had been established,
the Supreme Court had little difficulty in concluding that divestiture was
the appropriate remedy:
It cannot be gainsaid that complete divestiture is peculiarily appropriate in
cases of stock acquisitions which violate § 7. That statute is specific and
"narrowly directed," Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 312
(1949), and it outlaws a particular form of economic control-stock
acquisitions which tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce. The
very words of § 7 suggest that an undoing of the acquisition is a natural
remedy. . . [Divestiture] should always be in the forefront of a court's
mind when a violation of § 7 has been found.52
This decision is part of a consistent pattern. Many cases have similarly
noted *that divestiture is a particularly appropriate remedy for illegal
acquisitions. Other merger cases have not discussed the issue at all, but
have simply ordered divestiture as a matter of course. 54 And one final case
supports this viewpoint with an eloquent silence. The Supreme Court,
when considering the merger between the Brown and Kinney shoe
companies, gave an exhaustively detailed analysis of the legal liability. On
the subject of relief, however, the Court found need for few words. It
merely observed that the decree "will be an order of full divestiture."
55
The same principles that govern relief in merger cases also guide the
choice of remedies in the case of holding-company monopolies. These
monopolies were the classic "trusts" at which the antitrust laws were first
directed. They generally worked by bringing the independent firms of an
industry under the common control of a single holding company. The
holding company could thereafter establish uniform prices and terms of
sale for the industry, but in other respects it left its subsidiaries intact as
separate operating units. The act of creating such a monopoly is in many
respects like the act of making an anticompetitive acquisition. It entails a
single identifiable step, which, when undone, will allow the affected
business entities to resume their previously competitive positions.
For this reason, structural remedies are preferred in dealing with the
reluctance. It may have preferred, as the dissent intimated, to have found some present restraint of
trade. See id. at 609 (Burton, J., dissenting). It was precluded from doing so by the trial court's original
findings of facts, however, which concluded that no such restraint had taken place. See 126 F. Supp,
235, 335 (N.D. Ill. 1954). The Supreme Court therefore treated the case as one of structural potential
alone.
52. 366 U.S. at 328-31 (footnotes omitted).
53. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562,573 (1973); United States v. El Paso
Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 662 (1964); Schine Chain Theaters, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 128
(1948); United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 189 (1944),
54. See, e.g., Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass'nv. United States, 362 U.S. 458 (1960);
Aluminum Co. of America v. FTC, 284 F. 401 (3d Cir. 1922), cert. denied, 261 U.S. 616 (1923),
modification denied, 299 F. 361 (3d Cir. 1924). Some additional cases, which might be considered
exceptions to this statement, were distinguished by the Court in duPont. See 366 U.S. at 330 n.13.
Those cases involved exceptional circumstances (private actions and serial acquisitions) and so should
not significantly affect the general rule.
55. Brown Shoe, Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 309 (1962).
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problem of holding-company monopolies. Such cases figured prominently
in the early history of the Sherman Act. The best example of this may be
the Standard Oil litigation.56 This case dealt with the old Rockefeller trust,
which had been put in a new guise by using Standard Oil of New Jersey as
the holding company for some thirty-four major subsidiaries. The
Supreme Court undid that monopoly by the simple expedient of ordering
the subsidiaries to be spun back off to Standard Oil's shareholders, thus re-
creating their independent status.57 In so ruling it set a pattern for the
future. Later cases regularly ordered structural relief when holding-
company monopolies were discovered.58
The dissolution of holding companies has not been confined to
situations in which the subsidiaries had been subsumed without alteration.
This remedy has also been used in cases where the holding company had, to
some limited extent, consolidated its subsidiaries or otherwise altered their
organizational form. In those cases the decree was aimed at reconstituting
the industry structure to the greatest extent feasible. In one such case the
district court was directed to devise "some plan or method of dissolving the
combination and of recreating, out of the elements now composing it, a
new condition which shall be honestly in harmony with and not repugnant
to the law." 59 In another case the trial court ordered divestiture "in such
manner and into such number of parts of separate and distinct ownership
as may be necessary to restore competitive conditions in harmony with
law. 6
0
The cases dealing with the re-creation of consolidated subsidiaries-
such as those discussed above-appear to be valid precedents, but they
represent a line of analysis that can be carried only a limited distance.
Beyond a certain point the functional integration carried out by the
holding company will have affected the business situation to such an extent
that it must be counted as an intervening circumstance. Relief can then no
longer be thought of as simply undoing a single act of acquisition. The
problem must instead be approached as one related to an integrated
monopoly, with the attendant difficulties of identifying and correcting the
56. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
57. Id. at 77-82. Many of those subsidiaries carried out single functions rather than being each
vertically integrated. The spinoff of internally-integrated companies would have been even more
clearly appropriate, since there would have been less risk of a loss of efficiency.
58. See, e.g., United States v. Southern Pac. Co., 259 U.S. 214,230,231 (1922); United States v.
Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26, 57-59 (1920); International Harvester v. Missouri, 234 U.S. 199,209(1914);
United Statesv. UnionPac. R.R. Co.,226 U.S. 61,88 (1912).These cases arediscussed in United States
v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945).
59. United States v.AmericanTobacco Co.,221 U.S. 106,187 (191 l). This case was decided only
two weeks after Standard Oil, and the two are frequently read together. Thus it appears that the Court
did not intend to differentiate between holding companies that had and had not made alterations in
their subsidiaries.
60. United Statesv. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693,696 (1927).Thiswasone outofa
number of forms of decree, both litigated and consent, that the districtcourt adopted atvarious phases
of the litigation. See id. at 696-97.
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improper acts of monopolization. It is to that aspect of structural relief
that the following section is devoted.
B. Structural Relief That Cures an Essential Element of the Offense
Structural remedies are also appropriate, a; a second general
category, in cases in which they directly cure an essential element of an
antitrust offense. If a certain type of industry structure is an essential part
of the violation, in other words, then a decree that altered the structure
would directly act to cure the violation. This category is found in a slightly
different kind of case from those discussed in the previous section. The
cases here, like those undoing an unlawful act, deal with situations in
which the underlying offense is essentially structural in nature. The
structural remedy is therefore an obvious and effective solution. Unlike
those cases, however, the picture now is complicated by a greater number
of variables. There may be other essential elements of the offense in
addition to the structural situation; there may be other methods of curing
the violation that do not operate directly on any of its essential elements;
and there is less clearly a "bad" act upon which stringent remedies may be
predicated. As a result, the structural remedy, while always possible, is not
the necessary or universal form of relief.
This category of structural relief is exemplified by one situation in
particular-the monopolization case. Since monopoly involves a
structural situation in terms of market share, it is particularly amenable to
structural remedies. Yet, at the same time, some element of conduct must
also be shown in order to make out a cause of action. 61 Hence conduct
relief could also, in theory, be effective in curing the violation. The
remainder of this section will consider the ways in which courts have
utilized these two remedies in monopolization cases.62
This undertaking is not as daunting as it may at first appear to be.
Monopolization cases are extremely complex and time-consuming, but
their complexity relates primarily to the issue of liability rather than to that
of relief. The trial on liability must grapple with such legal issues as
identifying the types of conduct that will constitute improper "acts of
monopolization," and with such factual issues as determining whether acts
of that kind had actually taken place. Thereafter, however, the ingredients
of the remedy are relatively simple.
The law of liability in monopolization cases need not detain us for
long. Only a brief synopsis will be presented here by way of background.
61. Various "no-conduct" monopoly theories have been proposed over the last decade. Under
those theories the quantum of conduct that must be shown would be either reduced or else eliminated
altogether. To date, however, no court has accepted such a theory. This subject will be discussed in
greater detail infra.
62. Courts, however, have not always distinguished between the legal standards applicable to
divestitures in merger and in monopoly situations. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U,S,
562, 573 (1972) (citing Sherman Act and Clayton Act cases without differentiation).
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The basic offense was most recently defined by the Supreme Court in the
following terms:
The offense of monopoly under section 2 of the Sherman Act has two ele-
ments: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and
(2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that poweras distinguished from
growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business
acumen, or historic accident.63
The first element of the offense-possession of monopoly power-has
been defined as possession of "the power to control market prices or
exclude competition. 64 In principle the degree of market power possessed
by a particular firm should be determined after a study of the unique
characteristics of its market.65 In practice, however, courts have often been
willing to infer market power from the evidence of a firm's market share."
The Supreme Court in one important case remarked that a ninety percent
market share "is enough to constitute a monopoly; it is doubtful whether
sixty or sixty-four percent would be enough; and certainly thirty-three
percent is not. 67 Thus, where market share is high, the principal element in
a monopolization case is ordinarily straightforward and structural.
The second element of the offense-willful acquisition or
maintenance of that monopoly power-has produced greater conceptual
difficulties. Three slightly different standards have been articulated at
various times.68 Some cases have held that an illegal act of monopolization
takes place when a firm utilizes exclusionary practices that are themselves
unlawful restraints of trade under the Sherman Act.69 Other cases have
held that the acts need not be independently illegal, so long as they were
adopted as part of a conscious effort to achieve, exercise, or retain
monopoly power.70 A third group of cases has established a still more
63. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
64. Id. at 571, citing United States v. E.I. duPont deNemours &Co. (Cellophane), 351 U.S. 377
(1956). See also United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 105 (1948); American Tobacco Co. v. United
States, 328 U.S. 781, 811 (1946). The ascertainment of market power must be preceded by a definition
of the relevant market, which in some cases may be a difficult issue in itself. See, e.g., United States v.
E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
65. See United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495,527-28 (1948). Ideally, the market
study should consider such factors as the presence of other firms "in the wings," the height of entry
barriers, the availability of product substitutes, and so forth. See generally L. SuLLIvAN, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF ANTITRUST §§ 22-32 (1977).
66. See ABA, ANTITusT LAW DEvELOP.ob S 53-55 (1975); O'Connor, The Divestiture
Remedy in Sherman Act § 2 Cases, 13 HARV. J. LEGIS. 687, 720 n.l 16 (1976).
67. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945).
68. These three standards were identified and differentiated in United States v. United Shoe
Mach. Co., 110 F. Supp.295,342(D. Mass. 1953),affldpercuriam,347 U.S. 521 (1954).Thestandards
were formulated in a similar but slightly different way in L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
ANTITRusr §§ 33-39 (1977).
69. See, e.g., United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495,518 (1948); United States v.
Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 106 (1948).
70. See, e.g., United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948); United States v. Aluminum Co.
of America, 148 F.2d 416, 431-32 (2d Cir. 1945) (alternative ground) (conduct falling short of
monopoly "is not illegal unless it is part of a plan to monopolize, or to gain such other control of a
market as is equally forbidden").
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stringent standard, and has held that it is improper for a monopolist to
adopt any practice that is "needlessly" exclusionary, in the sense that it
disadvantages competitors more than any rational alternative business
practice would do.7  A case may be prosecuted under this last theory
without any showing of specific intent to monopolize on the part of the
respondent firm. 2 The courts have not always distinguished carefully
among these three theories, even within the context of a single case, but
that is an issue for another article. The point that concerns us now is
simply that some proof of bad conduct-although perhaps only in a small
and still-decreasing quantity7l-is required as part of a monopolization
case.
The presence of two elements in the monopolization offense means
that there are, in theory, two remedial paths that might be taken. A
structural remedy could be used to break up the monopoly power, or a
conduct remedy could be used to enjoin the forbidden acts of monopoliza-
tion. Both possibilities have been recognized from the very beginning of
antitrust law. Also from the beginning, however, has been a certain
preference for the structural remedy. This made its appearance as early as
the decision in Standard Oil:
It may be conceded that ordinarily where it was found that acts had been done
in violation of the statute, adequate measure of relief would result from
restraining the doing of such acts in the future. Swift v. United States, 196
U.S. 375. Butin a case like this, where the condition which has been brought
about in violation of the statute, in and of itself, is not only a continued
attempt to monopolize, but also a monopolization, the duty to enforce the
statute requires the application of broader and more controlling
remedies . . . . [I]t follows that to meet the situation with which we are
confronted the application of remedies two-fold in character becomes
71. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 431 (2d Cir. 1945)
(alternative ground); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass, 1953)
("market control is inherently evil and constitutes a violation of § 2 unless economically inevitable"),
affidper curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954); accord, Greyhound Computer Corp. v. IBM, 559 F.2d 488,498,
502-03 (9th Cir. 1977).
72. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416,431-32 (2d Cir. 1945) ("no
monopolist monopolizes unconscious of what he is doing'). This third group of cases therefore may
not actually state a theory different from the second, but may instead be only a vehicle for dispensing
with a difficult issue of proof. The Alcoa case, forexample, can be interpreted as only the circuit court's
effort to find a way around the trial court's finding, with which it disagreed, that the company had acted
with no improper motives. A charge of attempted monopolization, on the other hand, does require a
showing of specific intent. See Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905) (Holmes, J.); United
States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295,346 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'dper curtam, 347 U.S.
521 (1954). See also Hallmark Indus. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 489 F.2d 8, 12 n.3 (9th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974). Presumably, this proof is required because the respondent, being farther
away from his goal, has more ambiguous intentions. Under these circumstances, moreover, with threat
of actual monopoly still somewhat remote, it seems best not to needlessly discourage vigorotis and
innovative competition, even if that is deliberately intended to capture some of the business from a
rival.
73. Some believe that this series of decisions has made it almost inevitable that objectionable
conduct will be found in cases involving substantial and persistent monopoly power. See Antitrust
Symposium: Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 10 Sw. L. REv. 35 (1978) (articles and comments by
Maxwell Blecher and Judge Charles Wyzanski).
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essential: 1st. To forbid the doing in the future of acts like those which we
have found to have been done in the past which would be violative of the
statute. 2d. The exertion of such measure of relief as will effectually dissolve
the combination found to exist in violation of the statute, and thus neutralize
the extension and continually operating force which the possession of the
power unlawfully obtained has brought and will continue to bring about.!*
The preference for structural remedies has continued into the more
recent cases. As part of the Alcoa litigation, for example, the Second
Circuit summarized its order to the trial court in the following terms:
[W]e tried to make it plain that the final judgment must secure the
establishment of those "competitive conditions" which the Antitrust Acts
demand. Dissolution is one remedy which may be necessary to that end; and
in any event it will not depend upon the single issue whether "Alcoa" at the
time of the judgment shall have a monopoly of the ingot market. On the
contrary, it will depend upon what is"Alcoa's" position in the industry at that
time: i.e., whether it must be divided into competing units in order to conform
with the law. The continuance of the monopoly in ingot aluminum may in the
court's judgment be enough to justify dissolution; but its absence will forbid
neither dissolution, nor any other remedy.
75
It will be noted that this language refers to the alternatives of structural and
conduct relief without expressly favoring either one of them over the other.
The basic thrust of the passage, however, is to remove various objections
that might be made against the structural remedy. Its underlying sense
therefore seems to be that of encouraging the use of such remedies.
Despite their emphasis on structural remedies both these cases also
held open the possibility of relying on conduct-oriented relief alone. Such a
course has, in fact, been tried fairly often,76 but frequently with unsatis-
factory results. Divestiture may therefore remain the remedy of choice.
This is best illustrated by the history of the United Shoe Machinery7
litigation. That case arose on the government's allegation that the
company held some eighty-five percent of the market for the machinery
used in manufacturing shoes. The trial court held that this constituted an
illegal monopoly, since the company had protected its market position by
adopting a number of unnecessarily restrictive practices.78 The court
declined to order structural relief, however, since the respondent's single
manufacturing plant was not readily divisible. Instead, it entered an
74. 221 U.S. at 77-78.
75. United States v. District Court, 171 F.2d 285, 286 (2d Cir. 1948). This case arose on a
mandamus action, in which the Justice Department alleged that the Alcoa trial court had not fully
followed the Second Circuit's mandate after the principal appeal on the issue of liability. Ultimatcly. no
structural relief was ordered, but this was due to exceptional circumstances that will be discusstd in the
text accompanying note 208 infra.
76. One commentator examined the Justice Department's 62 most recent single-firm monop-
olization cases, and found that substantial divestiture was ordered in only four of them. See notes
217-23 and accompanying text infra.
77. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), afd per
curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
78. Id. at 344-45.
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injunction against the restrictive practices that had constituted the acts of
monopolization.79 It also announced that the situation would be reviewed
at the end of the ten years to determine whether this injunction had in fact
had the intended effect of enabling competitors to erode the defendant's
market share.
The matter was duly reviewed ten years later.80 The trial court found
that United Shoe Machinery's market share, while still high, had declined
from eighty-five percent to approximately sixty-two percent. 81 The court
therefore concluded that the order was working as intended and refused to
modify it.82 The Supreme Court reversed.8 3 It agreed, consistently with the
other cases in this area, that a remedy might properly use "means less
drastic than immediate dissolution or divestiture, ' 8 4 but it also held that
reliance on such methods had proven insufficient in this case:
If the decree has not, after ten years, achieved its "principle objects," namely,
"to extirpate practices that have caused or may hereafter cause monopoliza-
tion, and to restore workable competition in the market"--the time has come
to prescribe other, and if necessary more definitive, means to achieve this
result. A decade is enough. 5
On remand the parties finally settled the case through a consent decree,
under which the defendant agreed to divest itself of assets sufficient to
reduce -its market share to no more than thirty-three percent.
86
Thus the conduct remedy did not fare well in one of the most recent
and well-documented cases in which it was used. We may anticipate that
such remedies will be used more sparingly in the future than in the past.
There are at least two reasons for this conclusion. The first is the
discouraging precedent of the United Shoe Machinery case itself. The
second relates to the changing role of conduct evidence in proving the
underlying offense of monopolization8 7 The early cases required that
conduct be markedly abusive before it would be characterized as an "act of
monopolization."88 If conduct violations of this magnitude were halted, it
79. Thus, it purged the equipment leases of restrictive terms, id. at 349; required that equipment
be offered for sale as well as lease, id. at 349-50; and required that service contracts be separately billed
rather than included in the original selling price. The court also ordered divestiture of certain small
subsidiary companies, id. at 351, but this was not an important part of the decree.
80. 266 F. Supp. 328 (D. Mass. 1967), rev'd, 391 U.S. 244 (1968).
81. 266 F. Supp. at 331.
82. Id. at 334-35.
83. 391 U.S. 244 (1968).
84. Id. at 250-51.
85. Id. at 251-52.
86. [1969] Trade Cas. 72,688 (D. Mass. 1969).
87. This point is derived from the trial court's opinion on relief in thC Alcoa case, after remand
following the Second Circuit's decision on liability. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 91
F. Supp. 333, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
88. This is illustrated bya line of cases in which monopoly power had been unlawfully acquired,
followed by a period of forbearance from abuse of that power. The abandonment of abusive conduct
was held sufficient to allow the companies to escape liability. See United States v. American Can Co.,
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could be expected that the change would have a significant effect on
competition. Under the current law, however, conduct can be improper if
it is merely exclusionary to some degree. Such conduct has less intrinsic
importance than that which was required under the earlier standard, and
so its elimination may be expected to affect the competitive situation to a
correspondingly smaller extent.8 Now more than ever structural remedies
may have to be used in order to achieve effective relief.
The goal of the structural remedy is generally phrased in terms of
restoring "workable competition" to the market. This was the standard
used in United Shoe Machinery," and it has also been used in a number of
other cases. 91 The formula does not require any particular market
structure or the creation of any specific number of competing firms. As a
rule of thumb, however, the courts appear to be content if the decree
reduces the defendant's market share to fifty percent. This number has
appeared on several occasions.92
A divestiture order should not focus on market structure in static
terms alone. It is not enough that the new firms be given fifty percent of the
market on the day the order takes effect. They must also have the resources
necessary to remain in the market as viable competitors for the future. A
well-conceived structural decree will therefore give considerable attention
to these matters. The best decision of this sort may be the one in United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa).93 In that case the trial court
exhaustively considered the relative strength of Alcoa and its competitors
in terms of gross sales, production at different levels of the manufacturing
process, and access to capital, raw materials, and key patents.
A structural decree may incorporate various collateral terms in order
230 F. 859 (D. Md. 1916); cf. United Statesv. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S.417 (1920) (dominant
firm but not monopoly). But see United States v. International Harvester Co., 214 F. 987 (D. Minn.
1914).
89. The conduct involved in the best-known recent cases may be characterized as conduct that
had the effect of raising entry barriers. The lease-only policy of United Shoe Machinery can be
understood in these terms, for example, as can Alcoa's expansion of its capacity in anticipation of
industry demand. Neither practice set up a virtual bar to new competition in the same sense that
sustained below-cost pricing would do. Both were held improper merely because they made it
somewhat more difficult for additional firms to enter the industry.
90. 391 U.S. 244 (1968).
91. See, e.g., United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693 (1927); United Statesv.
Pitney-Bowes, Inc., [1959] Trade Cas. 69,235, at 74,864 (D. Conn. 1959) (consent decree)
("substantial competition"); United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., [1954] Trade Cas. 1 67,920
(W.D.N.Y. 1954) (same); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 91 F. Supp. 333,340 (S.D.N.Y.
1950) ("effective competition").
92. See, e.g., United States v.Aluminum Co. ofAmerica,91 F. Supp. 333,359,416-17 (S.D.N.Y.
1950) (disposal of war surplus factories to competitors had reduced defendant to "just under" 50%; no
domestic divestiture ordered); United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., [1954] Trade Cas. 67,920, at
70,009 (W.D.N.Y. 1954) (consent decree) (defendant to divest processing capacity in excess of50% of
market, unless effective competition otherwise shown). See also Schine Chain Theaters, Inc.v. United
States, 334 U.S. 110, 127(1948) (district court, perhaps wrongly, did not considera plan to dissolvethe
defendant into three corporations); United States v. IBM, [1956] Trade Cas. 68,245 (S.D.N.Y.
1956) (divestiture to be ordered if conduct injunction did not bring firm's share of the tabulating-card
market below 50%), divestiture ordered, [1963] Trade Cas. 8824.46 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
93. 91 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
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to ensure the viability of the divested firms. Most obviously, it may forbid
the exclusionary practices that had helped to create the monopoly in the
first place. In addition to this, however, the decree may contain subsidiary
provisions which are themselves of a structural nature. Many of these have
been devised over the years: defendants have been ordered to license their
patents; 94 to provide know-how through consultants or operating
manuals;95 to restrict their sales outlets to only a single dealer in a town;
96
to sell equipment rather than merely lease it, thus creating a second-hand
market;97 and to refrain from making further acquisitions in the future,
except on an affirmative showing that such acquisitions will not harm
competition."
Thus far we have discussed two general categories of structural
cases-those undoing a wrongful act, which deal with mergers and holding
companies; and those curing an essential element of the offense, which deal
with monopolization. These are the principal areas in which structural
relief has been held proper. Such relief has also been granted, however,
under a few more specialized circumstances. Those will be discussed under
the next three headings.
C. Structural Relief as a Means of Depriving
Defendants of the Fruits of Their Misconduct
Structural relief is also authorized when it will deprive a defendant of
the specific benefits he has reaped from an antitrust violation:
In this type of case we start from the premise that an injunction against future
violations is not adequate to protect the public interest. If all that was done
was to forbid a repetition of the illegal conduct, those who had unlawfully
built their empires could preserve them intact. They could retain the full
dividends of their monopolistic practices and profit from the unlawful
restraints of trade which they had inflicted on competitors. . . . [A] direct
method of causing appellants to surrender the gains from their conspiracy is
to require them to dispose of [properties] obtained by practices which violate
the antitrust acts.99
94. See Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945); United States v. Pitney-
Bowes, Inc., [1959] Trade Cas. 69,235 (D. Conn. 1959) (consent decree); United States v. Eastman
Kodak Co., [1954] Trade Cas. 67,920 (W.D.N.Y. 1954) (consent decree); cf. United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 91 F. Supp. 333,410 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (company enjoined from enforcing
grant-back rights on improvement patents).
95. United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 353-58 (1947); United States V. Pitney-
Bowes, Inc., [1959] Trade Cas. 69,235 (D. Conn. 1959) (consent decree). United States v. Eastman
Kodak Co., [1954] Trade Cas. 67,920 (W.D.N.Y. 1954) (consent decree).
96. United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693,706 (1927). This appeared to be
an extremely effective provision, since it enabled competitors to improve their distribution systems and
market penetration.
97. See Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945); United Statesv. United Shoe
Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295,349-50 (D. Mass. 1953), affidper curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954); United
States v. Pullman Co., 50 F. Supp. 123,137 (E.D. Pa. 1943) (dictum), afJ'dbv an equally divided court,
330 U.S. 806 (1947).
98. See, e.g., United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 186-87 (1944); cf.
Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 428 (1945) (trade association could be
reestablished only on such terms).
99. Schine Chain Theaters, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 128-29 (1948).
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This theory of structural relief originated with the decision in the
Schine Theaters case quoted above. The defendants in that case were three
individuals and six related corporations. Together they owned 148 movie
theaters, mainly located in small towns in Ohio and upstate New York.10'
This group negotiated as a unit with the distributors from whom they
obtained films for exhibition. By using their pooled buying power-and
particularly the power derived from the towns in which they owned the
only theater-the defendants were able to get especially desirable films and
especially favorable financial terms. 10 ' This in turn placed their
competitors at a disadvantage, a disadvantage that was further
compounded by the defendants' local price-cutting and other unilateral
acts of predation. Through these means the defendants forced many
independent theater owners to sell out to them.
0 2
The trial court found this course of conduct to be improper in many
respects. It was an abuse of the monopoly power that the defendants
enjoyed in one-theater towns; it involved a conspiracy to monopolize in
other towns; and it embodied various individual acts in restraint of
trade. 103 The court therefore ordered that theaters in approximately forty
towns be sold.'04
The Supreme Court reversed with respect to the selection of remedy,
on the theory that a remedy should focus, at least initially, on depriving a
defendant of the specific fruits of his violation:
Nor do the findings reflect an inquiry to determine what theaters had been
acquired by Schine through methods which violate the [Sherman] Act. So far
as the findings reveal, the theatres which are ordered divested may be
properties which in whole or in part were lawfully acquired; and theatres
which Schine is permitted to retain may, so far as the findings reveal, be ones
which it obtained as the result of tactics violating the Act. . . . The case
must therefore be remanded so that the District Court may make appropriate
findings on this phase of the case.10 5
The Court conceded that further divestiture might be needed in order to
wholly eliminate the defendants' monopoly power,'06 but it emphasized
that divestiture should begin with the identifiable fruits of the violation.'0 7
This approach to structural relief, it should be noted, is not confined
to monopolization cases. It may apparently be invoked to correct antitrust
violations of any type. This is illustrated by the opening quotation of this
100. Id. at 113.
101. Id. at 114.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 126-27.
105. Id. at 127-29.
106. Id. at 129.
107. Id. It may not always be possible to distinguish between monopoly power and the
identifiable fruits of its exercise, however. One court has suggested that "the power itself, and not the
specific elements thereof, must sometimes be viewed as the fruit.' "United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 91 F. Supp. 333, 346 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
1979]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
section, in which the Court referred without differentiation to
"monopolistic practices," "restraints of trade," and "practices which
violate the antitrust acts."' ' Any of those things would evidently justify
divestiture of the sort described in the opinion. 10 9 This reading of the
decision is reinforced by the facts of the case itself. Although the
defendants had monopoly power in some areas and were seeking to
achieve it in others, many of their acquisitions were proximately effected
by the simple means of predatory pricing. The fruits of that unfair practice,
as well as the fruits of monopolization in specific markets, were to be
divested.
Before deciding to rely on the "fruits" theory, however, it should be
asked whether this remains a vital part of contemporary law, or whether it
was instead only a transitional doctrine of the 1940s. In two respects the
theory has that air of expediency that characterizes much transitional law.
First, it enables the court to decree structural relief without having to
address the complex economic questions related to deciding what amount
of divestiture is needed in order to re-create competitive conditions,
Second, by restricting divestiture to the products of the violation the
theory contains an internal limiting mechanism that will prevent a court
from ordering damagingly excessive divestiture in the name of "complete"
relief. In short, the "fruits" theory can be viewed as a product of a time
when the Supreme Court had accepted the need for a greater use of
structural remedies, but had not yet become comfortable with economic
analysis or confident in the lower courts' ability to apply it wiseiy."
In light of these considerations, the "fruits" theory would seem best
considered as only a secondary souce of divestiture power. Its somewhat
mechanistic approach probably does represent legal thinking at a
transitional stage, and one which has now been largely displaced by
economic analysis looking directly to the ultimate question of industry
competitiveness. At the same time, however, the theory has an
independent moral basis that has not been questioned or repudiated, and it
thus remains as a legitimate option. There are likely to be cases in which its
use would still be appropriate. The "fruits" theory has the great virtue of
simplicity, for example. It would therefore lend itself to those relatively
108. See text accompanying note 99 supra.
109. A similar conclusion may be inferred from Schine Theaters'companion case, United States
v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948). There the Court observed that a particular ownership
situation, even if of a sort not usually violating the Sherman Act, would be legally vulnerable if it had
been achieved "as a result of practices which constitute unreasonable restraints of trade." Id. at 171. On
the previous page the Court noted more specifically that divestiture might be appropriate for the
fruits of an attempt to monopolize. Id. at 170.
110. In one respect the theory may be directly contrary to economic learning, The theory
postulates that a court order of divestiture is needed in order to prevent a defendant from retaining the
fruits of his violation. Chicago School economists would claim that economically-unjustified
acquisitions cannot be retained in the absence of improper conduct, and once the conduct is enjoined
the defendant will have to sell the fruits in any case. On the other hand, however, the defendant would
presumably be able to keep at least those improperly-acquired properties which fit rationally within his
business structure, and this alone may be sufficiently undesirable to require correction.
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minor cases in which a full-scale economic analysis would not be justified.
Such cases might examine local acquisitions, otherwise proper, that were
brought about by predatory pricing, price discrimination, or various forms
of exclusionary conduct.
D. Structural Relief as a Means of Depriving Defendants
of the Instrumentalities Used in the Violation
The fourth theory of structural relief goes a step beyond divesting the
fruits of a violation. It authorizes divestiture or destruction of the
instrumentalities used in the offense:
The [industry trade] association has undoubtedly been an important
instrument of restraint and monopoly. It may be made such again, and
detection and prevention and punishment for such resumption of violations
of law may be difficult if not impossible. In light of the record, we think it
better to order its dissolution, and to provide that the corporate defendants be
restrained for a period of five years from forming or joining any such trade
association . .. 11.
Although this aspect of the Hartford-Empire case concerned a trade
association, the question of divesting the instrumentalities of violation
arises most frequently with respect to patent violations 12 That, in fact,
was the principal subject of the case. The defendants there were nine
manufacturers of automatic glassblowing machinery. They accumulated a
pool of over 800 patents covering such apparatus, and manipulated the
grant of licenses from this pool in such a way as to restrict production and
deter new entry. The defendants were duly convicted of both conspiracy
and monopolization. The Court granted, among other relief, divestiture of
the assets used in carrying out this plan. It ordered the defendants to license
all applicants, at reasonable royalities, with any of their existing or future
patents on the kinds of glassblowing machinery involved in the suit.1
The divestiture of instrumentalities is not confined to patent cases,
however. It has been found appropriate in at least two other situations as
well. The first is in the case of motion-picture buying pools of the sort
described in Schine Theaters. A companion case, United States v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc.,114 held that certain theaters could be divested on
that ground: "Morever, even if lawfully acquired, they may have been
111. Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 428 (1945).
112. The nexus between patent and antitrust law is a complex subject, and one that is generally
beyond the scope of this article. It will be discussed here only briefly and for the sake of completeness.
The basic principle of this subject is that patents confer no absolute rights. An antitrust violation can
result if they are used to restrain trade beyond the terms of the patent grant itself. See Standard
Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20, 49 (1912).
113. This relief is conceptually a "divestiture," since the defendants are being deprived of a
valuable property right-here, the right to a monopoly on manufacture for the seventeen-year terra of
the patent. It is true the Court rejected the idea of royalty-free licensing on the grounds that it would be
confiscatory. 323 U.S. at 423-24. The resulting relief was still a divestiture, however, since any firm that
is ordered to dispose of certain operations is entitled to sell them at a fair price.
114. 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
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utilized as part of the conspiracy to eliminate or suppress competition in
furtherance of the ends of the conspiracy. In that event divestiture would
likewise be justified." '115 Divestiture was also ordered in a case involving
monopoly in the promotion of professional boxing championships."' In
that case, two different types of instrumentalities were affected. The
defendant boxing clubs were dissolved outright,117 and the individual
defendants were ordered to sell their stock in Madison Square Garden. "It
may be that the stock in Madison Square Garden was not the fruit of the
conspiracy; but even if lawfully acquired it may be utilized as part of the
conspiracy to effect its ends." 18
This theory will apply, in short, to a wide variety of instrumentalities.
It appears that any mechanism that can be helpful in carrying out a trade
restraint can also be ordered divested on that basis.
A further question then arises: How deeply involved in the violation
must the instrumentality have been-how essential a role must it have
played in the offense-before divestiture is appropriate? Two general
principles seem to emerge from the cases. The instrumentality must have
been a central and essential mechanism in the unlawful scheme before it
can be reached. Once that criterion has been met, however, it is no defense
to show that the instrumentality was also used (or even primarily used) for
entirely legitimate purposes.
These principles are illustrated by a number of decisions. The trade
association in Hartford-Empire was a central factor in the conspiracy,
since it was through that agency that production quotas were estab-
lished.1 9 The Court thereupon ordered the association dissolved, even
though it recognized that under a different injunction it might have con-
tinued as "an innocent trade association for what have been held lawful
ends.' 20 The theaters that were ordered divested in Paramount were essen-
tial to the violations there, since it was through theater ownership that the
defendants could obtain such anticompetitive benefits as long clearances
and runs.2 1 At the same time, the basic use of the theaters was for the
exhibition of films to the public, a use which was both innocuous and in
accordance with the public policy. A similar situation was present in the
International Boxing Club 22 case. The ownership of Madison Square
Garden gave the defendants control of a "bottleneck" resource and was
thus essential to their conspiracy, 123 but the arena was normally used for
115. Id. at 152.
116. International Boxing Club v. United States, 358 U.S. 242 (1959).
117. Id. at 260.
118. Id. at 256.
119. 323 U.S. at 400.
120. Id. at 428.
121. 334 U.S. at 144-48.
122. International Boxing Club v. United States, 358 U.S. 242 (1959).
123. Id. at 248.
[Vol. 40:779
STRUCTURAL REMEDIES
the proper purposes of sports exhibition. The stock in Madison Square
Garden was ordered divested. 24
It remains only to ask whether the "instrumentalities" theory, like the
"fruits" theory, is a transitional rule that has to some extent been overtaken
by more modem antitrust concepts. The answer appears to be that the two
theories do indeed stand on a roughly equal footing. The principal
instrumentalities cases date from the late 1940s, the same period during
which the fruits theory was developed, and the two probably emerged in
response to the same juridical needs. On the other hand, however, the
instrumentalities theory, again like the fruits theory, has never been
abandoned. It was even reaffirmed by the International Boxing Club
decision in 1959.125 Thus it appears that the theory remains as a valid
option for those particular fact situations in which it will apply.
Those situations may actually be quite broad and important, since
Paramount and International Boxing Club held the instrumentalities
theory applicable to assets that simply conferred significant market power,
either because those assets were large relative to the market or were
"bottleneck" resources. Hence the instrumentalities theory may apply
whenever the defendant has made use of assets that account for a large
share of a relevant market.
E. Use of Structural Remedies to Forestall a Bent Toward Recidivism
Finally, structural relief is appropriate when it will act as a brake on
defendants who have a particularly clear predispositon toward antitrust
violations. This is best illustrated by a series of cases arising out of the
meat-packing industry, in which firms had conspired among themselves to
enter the grocery business by. means of predatory pricing. They were not
only enjoined from that improper conduct, but were also forbidden to go
into the grocery business at all. 126 Upon a subsequent request for
modification the Supreme Court left this term intact: "Size and past
aggressions induced the fear in 1920 that the defendants, if permitted to
deal in groceries, would drive their rivals to the wall. Size and past
aggressions leave that fear unmoved today."
27
It is not clear whether the threat of recidivism is an independent basis
for structural relief, or whether it is instead a "tie-breaking" factor that
may be considered only when structural relief is also justified, although not
124. Id. at 258.
125. 358 U.S. at 255-56.
126. See United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 109-12 (1932) (Cardozo, J.).
127. Id. at 117. The weight of this case as precedent is diminished to some extent by the fact that
the initial injunction was imposed pursuant to a consent decree. The case therefore does not
unequivocably establish that structural relief can be granted on this theory in an adversary context. It
seems most likely that it can, however. The Supreme Court did not limit its decision, as it could easily
have done, to a consideration of the narrow circumstances under which consent judgments can be
modified. Rather, it went on in the language quoted above to consider the underlying merits of the
original decree.
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required, on some other ground. The existing decisions are ambiguous on
this point. On balance, however, the best reading seems to be that it is a
separate theory. This conclusion is suggested by two Supreme Court
opinions. In the Swift case, quoted above, the Court seemed to indicate
that its decision did not rest on any finding of monopoly power, or other
situation for which a structural remedy would ordinarily lie: "Mere size
. . . is not an offense against the Sherman Act unless magnified to the
point at which it amounts to a monopoly but size carries with it an op-
portunity for abuse that is not to be ignored when the opportunity is
proved to have been utilized in the past."'' 8 This issue was also ad-
dressed in the theater-circuit litigation. The Court there used the
defendant's past conduct as a basis for prohibiting certain kinds of theater
acquisitions in the future, even though such a ban was, of course, not
necessary in order to dissipate their present monopoly power: "The
pattern of past conduct is not easily forsaken. Where the proclivity for
unlawful activity has been as manifest as here, the decree should operate as
an effective deterrent to a repetition of the unlawful conduct .... " 129
Some may question whether any of these cases really dealt with
structural relief at all. They certainly did not call for dissolution,
divestiture, or other traditional forms of that remedy. Yet they do appear
to be "structural" in the most basic sense of the word. They affected the
underlying competitive makeup of an industry by keeping certain firms out
of it entirely. There is, moreover, no logical reason for limiting the remedy
to this extent. If the threat of recidivism will justify keeping a firm out of an
industry in the first place, it should also justify forcing that firm out of an
industry it has already entered. 3 ° Thus there seems no reason why this
theory will not support a conventional divestiture action as well.
Another, more indirect line of analysis also supports the notion that
the "threat of recidivism" is a separate legal theory. This analysis considers
the cases that have attempted to apply the theory in the opposite direction
and, treating the defendant's innocent intentions as indicative of a non-
recidivist character, have tried to deny the kind of structural relief that
128. Id. at 116 (citations omitted).
129. United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 186 (1944). A somewhat different
legal principle emerges from the Alcoa litigation, however. The trial court there pointed to the
defendant's basically good intentions as one reason for denying structural relief. Alcoa did not have "an
inveterate purpose to dominate an industry." United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 91 F. Supp.
333,345 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). Hence it would be improper to grant "a magnification of remedies." Id. This
last phrase suggests that divestiture predicated on bad intent is a form of enlarging a remedy already
granted on some other theory, rather than being an independent remedy in its own right. This entire
passage is dictum, however. It is outside the primary concerns of that case since the problem there wits
largely cured by the sale of war-surplus aluminum plants to smaller competitors. The passage should
therefore be given only limited weight.
130. The statement in text is not precisely correct. There are transaction costs involved in
moving a firm out of an industry, and no such costs in remaining out from the beginning, Hence a court
would be somewhat more reluctant to order a divestiture entailing such costs. Given the relatively small
size of the transaction costs in comparison with the opportunity costs imposed by the divestiture as a
whole, however, it would seem that the two situations are equivalent for many practical purposes,
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might otherwise be justified.' Both of those decisions were overturned at
later stages of their proceedings. 32 This fact does not conclusively prove
anything in particular, for there were a number of reasons for the
reversals. 133 It tends to suggest, however, that the issue of the defendant's
intent will cut in only one direction-a bad intent will enlarge remedies but
a good intent will not diminish them. This in turn suggests that recidivism
is a full-fledged legal theory rather than a mere equitable consideration. An
equitable consideration would presumably be taken into account
regardless of which way it pointed, but a legal theory is either relevant or
irrelevant to the facts of a particular case.
III. WHEN STRUCTURAL RELIEF HAS BEEN HELD INAPPROPRIATE
The cases discussed in the previous section covered a great deal of
ground. They indicated that structural remedies may be proper over a
relatively wide range of circumstances. It should not be thought, however,
that such remedies are always appropriate. The case law has also identified
a number of specific situations in which structural relief should not be
ordered. Those situations are the subject of this section.
In a sense there is only one such "situation," rather than a plurality of
them. The cases holding against structural relief have generally involved
the application, to a variety of factual situations, of a single legal principle.
That principle rests on the belief that structural remedies are harsh and
should not be resorted to unless clearly necessary. The principle therefore
states that structural remedies should not be used if some other remedial
device is available and would be equally effective.
Although the cases may not always articulate this principle, they do
reflect it in the rationales given for holdings in a number of specific
circumstances. Structural relief has been held to be improper: (1) when it is
punitive; (2) when less harmful means are available for accomplishing the
same result; (3) when there are practical obstacles to its use; (4) when it
would unduly harm such third parties as creditors or shareholders of the
defendant; and (5) when it would place the defendant in a legal status
significantly different from that of his competitors. The possible loss of
business efficiencies, on the other hand, although sometimes thought a
defense to a divestiture action, does not appear to be one. These various
situations will be discussed in sequence below.
A. Punitive Remedies
Structural relief would be improper, first of all, when it is used to
131. United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 177 F. Supp. 1, 14 (N.D. Ill. 1959)(dictum); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 348 (D. Mass. 1953).
132. United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316 (1961); United States v.
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244 (1968).
133. The duPont case was reversed for its failure to order full divestiture. See 366 U.S. 316
(1969). United Shoe Machinery was reversed later, at the time of a ten-year review, when it was
determined that pure conduct relief was not having sufficient effect. See 391 U.S. 244 (1968).
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punish the defendant rather than to correct the violation: "This is a civil,
not a criminal, proceeding. The purpose of the decree, therefore, is
effective and fair enforcement, not punishment."1 34 This point has been
repeated and paraphrased in many cases: "Courts are not authorized in
civil proceedings to punish antitrust violators, and relief must not be
punitive." 1
35
This principle is so well accepted that it is now of largely theoretical
importance. Very few cases prescribe remedies for overtly' 36 punitive
purposes. Attempts of this sort do occur, however, from time to time. This
is illustrated by the National Lead case, quoted above, 137 in which the
defendants had established a worldwide cartel in the sale of titanium
paint pigment. This was accomplished by various misuses of patent rights.
Patents were pooled, proliferated, and cross-licensed in such a way as to
divide territories globally.1 38 The district court found for the government
and ordered, among other relief, that the patents be licensed to all
applicants at reasonable royalities. 139 This forced licensing amounted in
effect to a divestiture sale of the patent rights.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, however, the government objected
to the provision for reasonable royalities. It asked instead for royalty-free
licensing or for a decree enjoining the defendants from enforcing their
patents. Either of these alternatives, it will be noted, would amount to a
forfeiture of the patents. The Court declined to make such a change:
Assuming, as is justified, that violation of the Sherman Act in this case has
consisted primarily of the misuse of patent rights . . . that conduct is not
before this Court for punishment. It is brought before this Court in order to
secure an order for its immediate discontinuance and for its future
prevention.140
The Court reasoned that a decree as drastic as forfeiture would be justified
only if it were necessary in order to reopen the market to competition,1 4 1
and this did not appear to be the case. Rather, the government appeared to
be influenced by the scope of the antitrust violation, and its goals were
therefore more nearly punitive than remedial.
B. Availability of Less Harsh Remedies
Truly punitive structural decrees may be quite rare, but on appeal it is
134. United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 338 (1947).
135. United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316,326 (1961). See also United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d 416,446 (2d Cir. 1945) ("Dissolution is not a penalty but
a remedy.").
136. Covertly punitive purposes are merely harder to detect, not proper. See Hartford-Empirc
Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386,409 (1945). ("We may not impose penalties in the guise of preventing
future violations.")
137. See text accompanying note 134 supra.
138. 332 U.S. at 327-28.
139. Id. at 336.
140. Id. at 348.




common for defendants to charge that the remedy had this character.
Defendants making this argument are generally using the word "punitive"
in a figurative rather than a literal sense. They are not complaining that the
trial court was actuated by motives of retribution, but rather that the
decree, while a rational cure for the violation, is broader or harsher than
necessary: "It is said that these provisions are inequitable and harsh
income tax wise, that they exceed any reasonable requirement for the
prevention of future violations, and that they are therefore
punitive . . ,,42
An argument along those lines invokes a well-established legal
principle. The courts have agreed that divestiture, while it may be available
in a particular situation, shQuld not be invoked as long as some other less
disruptive remedy would also meet the needs of the case. This principle
appeared as early as the decision in Standard Oil, in which the Court
observed that "one of the fundamental purposes of the statute [the
Sherman Act] is to protect, not to destroy, rights of property."1 43 A similar
observation was made a few years later. "So far as is consistent with this
purpose [curing the violation] a court of equity dealing with such
combinations should conserve the property interests involved ....
The Court has described dissolution as a remedy "extreme, even in its
mildest demands," and has concluded that "[i]f there be need for this the
difficulties of achievement should not deter; but the difficulties may
admonish against the need . .. .45
These statements convey the broad outlines of an important principle:
divestiture should not be used if another equally effective remedy is
available. The statements do not, however, flesh out that principle with the
kind of detail required for a complete understanding of it. In particular
they leave some doubt about the exact nature of the "equally effective"
alternative, and about what the Commission must prove in order to show
that no such alternative exists. At least three different standards are
consistent with the judicial language quoted above: (1) the Commission
must show that divestiture is the most effective remedy for the violation; or
(2) it must show that divestiture is the most cost-effective remedy; or (3) it
must show that divestiture is the only effective remedy.
It appears that the third standard is correct. The Commission must
generally show that divestiture is the only effective remedy before it win be
granted. This conclusion is most easily reached through a process of
elimination. The courts have already rejected the first two standards in a
reasonably decisive way.
142. United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 189 (1944).
143. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 78 (1911).
144. United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 226 U.S. 470, 477 (1913).
145. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 247 U.S. 32,46 (1918). Seealso United Statesv.
E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316,361 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting);Timken Roller
Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 603 (1951) (Reed, J., concurring); NBO Industries
Treadway Companies, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 523 F.2d 262, 279 (3rd Cir. 1975), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
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They have, first of all, rejected the notion that divestiture must be
shown to be the single most effective remedy to the violation. Rather, the
various possible remedies are considered to be either effective or not. Once
a remedy has crossed the threshold to "effective" status, it is no longer
compared with alternative remedies to see which would be marginally
better in curing the violation. The choice among effective remedies is
instead made on other grounds such as hardships or administrative
feasibility. This is best illustrated by the proceedings in the duPont'" case.
There the Supreme Court observed that "[e]coromic hardship can
influence choice only as among two or more effective remedies.' ' 47 From
this it follows that economic hardship can influence the choice when both
remedies are effective, and, as a result, a search is not necessarily made to
determine which of the remedies is precisely the best.
The role of hardship in the calculus is still limited, however. The
courts have also rejected the second possible formulation-that costs
should be systematically weighed in every case, and that divestiture should
be granted only when it is the remedy that appears most desirable in cost-
benefit terms. Rather, the costs of divestiture are wholly irrelevant until a
certain threshold of effectiveness has first been met. This is illustrated by
several cases. In duPont, as noted above, the Supreme Court held that
economic hardship "can influence choice only as among two or more
effective remedies.' 48 Thus the costs of a remedy would not be considered
at all until two effective ones had been found. ]In the United Shoe
Machinery49 litigation the Court mandated a divestiture without
questioning the trial court's finding that the business did not lend itself to
division and that, presumably, serious harm would result if such a division
were attempted. The Court found it sufficient to observe that the conduct
remedy had not been effective in curing the violation. 50 Thus, again, the
possible costs involved did not appear to enter into the Court's
calculations.
This is not to say that costs have no place in the selection of a remedy,
but only that remedies are not chosen through a rigorous application of
cost-benefit principles. The Court's analysis would have looked con-
siderably different if they were. Costs would have been relevant-and
would have been considered-even in the context of a remedy that fell
slightly below the desired threshold of effectiveness. They would have been
relevant in that context because they could have been very small, and so
could have made the remedy, on balance, more cost effective than one
whose effectiveness was just slightly over the threshold but whose costs
were very much greater. Cost, in short, must always be considered in a
146. United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316 (1961).
147. Id. at 327.
148. Id.
149. United States v. United States Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244 (1968).
150. Id. at 251.
[Vol, 40:779
STRUCTURAL REMEDIES
cost-benefit analysis. If they are not always considered then the courts are
proceeding under some other principle.
This leaves us with the third standard: before obtaining divestiture the
government must show that only that remedy will effectively cure the
violation. The notion of costs does not appear explicitly in this
formulation but appears to underlie it tacitly. Divestiture is presumed to be
harmful to the respondent, and thereby to impose costs upon it, in every
case. Nobody likes to be dissolved. In order to justify inflicting this harm
the government must therefore show that it is necessary. It must show that
no other remedy-presumptively less harmful 5 '-would meet the needs of
the case.
The courts have not generally articulated this rationale or expressly
endorsed the concept of presumptive costs. Their decisions are, however,
consistent with this theory. The language in many cases suggests that the
government has the burden of showing a specific need for divestiture as a
remedy. In Alcoa, for example, the Second Circuit made the following
observation: "[I]f the industry will not need [dissolution] for its pro-
tection, it will be a disservice to break up an aggregation which has for
so long demonstrated its efficiency."'' 52 In another case the Supreme Court
stated this point with even greater clarity:
There is no showing that four major competing units would be preferable to
two, or, including Zirconium and Virginia Chemical, that six would be better
than four. . . It is not for the courts to realign and redirect effective and
lawful competition where it already exists and needs only to be released from
restraints that violate the antitrust laws. To separate the operating units of
going concerns without more supporting evidence than has been presented
here to establish either the need for, or the feasibility of, such separation
would amount to an abuse of discretion. 53
There is one class of cases that may be an exception to this rule, but it
is narrowly defined. It will be recalled that structural remedies are
presumed to be proper in situations in which they would directly undo a
single improper action, such as a merger or the creation of a holding-
company monopoly. In these cases the government may not have the
burden of proving the necessity for divestiture. 5 4 Such cases, however, are
apparently restricted with some rigor to the two situations identified
151. A different situation might be posed if a respondent were to request divestiture in lieu of a
conduct remedy. Such cases are likely to be quite rare, however.
152. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416,446 (2d Cir. 1945).
153. United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 352-53 (1947). In some respects the
National Lead case may not be a safe precedent. It was decided on a 4-3 vote and the opinion was
written by Justice Burton, rather than by Justice Douglas as was usual for antitrust cases during that
period. The decision might be faulted on its actual merits, moreover, in the sense that there is some
credible evidence linking decreased concentration with improved economic performance generally.
With respect to National Lead's holding on the basic burden of proof issue, however, it seems to be
consistent with the general body of case law on the subject. The case may be understood as turning on
the government's failure to introduce evidence on a crucial point.
154. Technically speaking the defendant may have the burden of going forward on this issue,
while the ultimate burden of proof still rests on the government as the plaintiff in the suit.
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above. This is best illustrated by the decisions that have refused to extend
presumptive divestiture from original to after-acquired assets.
In one such case the respondent purchased a company engaged in the
business of manufacturing florists' foil. The acquisition was found
improper and the D. C. Circuit had little difficulty in upholding a
divestiture order. 155 The order extended, however, only to the restoration
of the status quo ante. It did not include a new manufacturing plant that
the acquiring company had built for its subsidiary. The circuit court was
willing in principle to include this property in the divestiture, but only if the
Commission could prove the necessity of this step in accordance with the
general burden of proof:
Inasmuch as there is a failure on this record to demonstrate (1) any nexus
between continued possession of after-acquired property . . . and violation
of Section 7, and (2) that restoration of the competitive status quo compels
divestiture of such property, that part of the Commission's order requiring
divestiture of property built or acquired after the 1956 acquisition . . . can-
not be sustained.56
Thus the special presumption favoring the government has been confined
to those circumstances-such as mergers-under which it originated. It
has not been extended to those situations-such as the acquisition of
additional assets following a merger-that might be considered as the next
logical corollaries.
15 7
The basic rule regarding burden of proof, moreover, is not limited to
those major situations in which the government seeks to have an entire
operating unit divested. It also applies to the more minor and collateral
terms of a decree. There too the government can obtain a structural
remedy only by showing that it is necessary for effective relief. This was
made clear in Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States,15 8 the case dealing
with the patent pool in the glassmaking industry. The trial court in
Hartford-Empire ordered major structural relief.'59 It also enjoined the
individual defendants from holding financial interests in more than one
company engaged in that business. 160 The Supreme Court modified this
collateral aspect of the decree, however, on the grounds that it was overly
broad. The decree covered small shareholdings that would not confer
control; it covered investments in firms that produced only a little
155. Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (Burger, J.),
156. Id. at 231.
157. It might be wiser if this extension were made, however. The acquired firm proved unsalable
without the inclusion of the after-acquired assets, and it was eventually ordered liquidated. See
Reynolds Metals Co., [1965-67] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 17,560 at 22,838. Cf. United States v. Reed
Roller Bit Co., 274 F. Supp. 573 (W.D. Okla. 1967). Two consent decrees, on the other hand, have
provided for the inclusion in the divestiture of all additions and improvements. See United States v.
Combustion Eng'r, Inc., [1971] Trade Cas. 73,648 (D. Conn. 1971); Gates Rubber Co., [1970-73]
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 19,657).
158. 323 U.S. 386 (1945).
159. Id. at 411-12.
160. Id. at 424-25.
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glassware; and it covered ownership of bonds as well as of voting stock.
There had been no showing that a cure to the violation required coverage
this broad. The decree was therefore amended so as to exempt such
situations.1
6 1
The basic law on this point thus appears to be reasonably clear. Two
general principles have emerged. Structural relief should not be ordered as
long as some alternative remedy would be equally effective in curing the
violation; and the government must prove the absence of such alternatives
by showing that divestiture-and only divestiture-will successfully
restore competitive conditions. It might therefore be thought that these
principles will raise a substantial barrier against the use of structural
remedies.
This, however, is not necessarily the case. The government must
advance some evidence of the need for divestiture, to be sure, but the
quantum of proof required does not seem particularly great. It appears
that even a small but reasonable doubt about the efficacy of the alternative
remedies will be sufficient to justify a decision in favor of structural relief.
This principle emerges from both the United Shoe Machinery and the
duPont litigations.
In each of these cases the trial court had ruled against divestiture,
framing instead an alternative plan of relief that seemed to be less
burdensome and equally effective. 62 In each case the Supreme Court
reversed on the grounds that there was some doubt about the efficacy of the
trial court's plan.1 63 What is significant about these cases, however, is how
slight and attenuated the grounds for the Supreme Court's doubts actually
were.
164
These cases will be reviewed under the next two headings of the paper.
United Shoe Machinery will be considered in connection with the
exemption from structural relief that is sometimes given where there are
practical obstacles to its use. DuPont will then be examined in connection
with the exemption that is sometimes given to protect the interests of
innocent third parties.
1 65
C. Existence of Practical Obstacles
Structural relief is clearly inappropriate in cases in which the legal or
factual preconditions for it do not exist. Even when the law and the facts
would both warrant such a remedy, however, it is not always granted.
Sometimes there are practical obstacles to its use that would justify, as an
exercise of discretion, a decision not to use it.
Courts have yielded to exigent circumstances in this manner on a few
161. Id. at 424-26.
162. See text accompanying note 132 supra.
163. See note 133 supra.
164. See notes 166-92 and accompanying text infra.
165. See text accompanying notes 166-73, 175-92 infra.
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occasions. In one monopolization case,1 66 for example, the court agreed
that dissolution was legally justified, 167 but still withheld that remedy on
the grounds that the defendant's business did not lend itself to such an
action:
The Government's proposal that the Court dissolve United into three
separate manufacturing companies is unrealistic. United conducts all
machine manufacture at one plant in Beverly, with one set of jigs and tools,
one foundry, one laboratory for machinery problems, one managerial staff,
and one labor force. It takes no Solomon to see that this organism cannot be
cut into three equal and viable parts. 68
The basic concept underlying this case appears to be correct: the
Commission cannot logically be obligated to order structural relief if the
circumstances are such that it would be unworkable. It also appears,
however, that this concept is somewhat narrower than might be thought.
Structural relief, if otherwise justified, cannot be denied merely because it
would be cumbersome or impractical to carry out. 16) Rather, it must be
virtually impossible to achieve before less effective remedies should be
considered. This was made clear by the subsequent history of the litigation.
The United Shoe Machinery case was overturned during a ten-year
review of the progress achieved under the trial court's conduct decree.1 70
The Supreme Court-in one of its most significant omissions-made no
reference to the practical difficulties of dividing the defendant's business. It
focused its analysis exclusively on the court's duty to provide some form of
effective relief:
If after 10 years it were shown that the decree had not achieved the adequate
relief to which the Government is entitled in a § 2 case, it would have been the
duty of the court to modify the decree so as to assure the complete extirpation
of the illegal monopoly. The court's power to do this is clear. Its duty is
implicit in the findings of violation of§ 2 and in the decisions of this court as
to the type of remedy which must be prescribed. 171
The Supreme Court holding was phrased in mandatory terms. In-
166. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 348 (D. Mass. 1953), af/'dper
curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
167. It was legally justified because the defendant corporation had monopolized its industry,
and, on the authority of Alcoa and Griffith, divestiture was viewed as an established remedy for that
offense.
168. 100 F. Supp. at 348.
169. Some earlier decisions had indeed used the language of "impracticality." See, e.g., United
States v. United States Steel Corp., 254 U.S. 417,453 (1920) (divestiture denied since court did not see a
way to dissolve combination while simultaneously protecting its foreign trade); United States v.
General Elec. Co., 115 F. Supp. 835, 864 (D.N.J. 1953) (divestiture of electric lamp business found
neither feasible nor necessary). Although these cases may still remain sound in their ultimate outcome,
however, it is doubtful that they correctly state the current law on the present point.
170. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244 (1968). The trial court conducted
this review pursuant to a term in the original decree, and concluded that no revisions in the order were
necessary. See 266 F. Supp. 328 (D. Mass. 1967). It was this decision that was appealed to the Supreme
Court.
171. 391 U.S. at 251.
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deed, on the previous page the Court had made its peremptory nature even
more clear; it referred there to the trial court's "inescapable responsibility"
of ensuring effective relief.1 72 From this it would appear that the exemption
for practical considerations is really quite limited, and will apply only
when the option of divestiture is absolutely unworkable.
173
D. Harm to Third Parties
A variation of the "practical difficulties" point has sometimes been
raised as a fourth reason for denying structural relief. This too considers
the practical effects of the decree, focusing not on the harm it might do to
an indivisibl6 defendant but rather on the harm it might do to innocent
third parties:
[In devising relief] three dominant influences must guide our action: 1. The
duty of giving complete and efficacious effect to the prohibitions of the
statute; 2, the accomplishing of this result with as little injury as possible to
the interest of the general public; and, 3, a proper regard for the vast interests
of private property which may have become vested in many persons as a result
of the acquisitions either by way of stock ownership or otherwise of interests
in the stock or securities of the combination without any guilty knowledge or
intent in any way to become actors or participants in the wrongs which we
find to have inspired and dominated the combination from the beginning.174
Several classes of "third parties" have a claim on the court's
solicitude-creditors of the defendant, for example, or employees, or
members of the general public. The class most frequently considered,
however, is the defendant's shareholders. These persons may be innocent
of wrongdoing themselves, since they cannot generally be expected to
know that their company has violated the antitrust laws, yet they still have
to bear the real costs of any remedy that is imposed on it. Courts are
therefore entitled to take account of their situation, and, all other things
being equal, to select a remedy that will harm them as little as possible. As
in the case of the "workability" exemption, however, divestiture may be
denied on this ground only when some other and equally effective remedy
is available.
This is best illustrated by the history of the duPont case previously
referred to during the discussion of mergers 7 5 -the case involving that
company's acquisition of some twenty-three percent of the common stock
172. Id. at 250.
173. The actual degree of "unworkability" in this case is subject to some dispute. After the
Supreme Court decision was announced, the defendant entered into a consent decree under which it
agreed to divest sufficient assets to reduce its market share to 33%. See [1969] Trade Cas. 1 72,688 (D.
Mass. 1969). This suggests that the practical obstacles to relief were not actually as great as the courts
may have supposed. It is also possible, on the other hand, that by consenting the defendant-was merely
attempting to forestall the still greater evil of a court-ordered divestiture plan. In either event the truly
significant fact about the matter was the way that it appeared to the Supreme Court. The Court was
willing to order divestiture relief even at a time when it appeared that this course would entail
significant practical costs.
174. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 185 (1911).
175. See text accompanying notes 47-51 supra.
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in General Motors. 176 The government sought an order requiring duPont
to divest itself of this stock by distributing it to its own shareholders as a
special dividend. For three reasons, however, the trial court was reluctant
to order this relief. First, the duPont shareholders would be heavily taxed
on the market value of this dividend. 177 Second, the sales of the distributed
stock-by recipients who either did not wish to hold it or who had to raise
money for the taxes-would depress the market value of both duPont and
GM stock.17 ' Third, the GM shares that would be distributed to the
duPont family holding companies and that would have to be sold pursuant
to the requested decree would bear a capital gains tax of over $200
million. 179 The trial court therefore concluded that complete divestiture
would be unduly harsh. It "would entail harsh consequences to a large
number of innocent parties and would therefore to that degree be against
the public interest and also offensive to justice.' ' 80
To deal with the violation, the trial court ordered conduct relief
instead.1 8' DuPont was enjoined from director interlocks with General
Motors and from preferential business relationships with that firm.1
82
DuPont was permitted to retain the legal titles to the GM shares, but was
to "pass through" the voting rights to its own shareholders. Officers or
directors of duPont were not to exercise any passed-through votes to
which they might be entitled.1
83
The Supreme Court reversed.184 It agreed, as it apparently did in
United Shoe Machinery,'85 that equitable considerations could sometimes
tip the balance in favor of conduct relief. But it found that conduct relief
176. At the time of the second trial this amounted to 63 million shares with a market value of
approximately $3.5 billion. 177 F. Supp. at 13.
177. United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 177 F. Supp. 1, 17 (N.D. I11. 1959).
178. Id. at 27.
179. Id. at 21.
180. Id. at 12. The trial court was fortified in this view by the belief that the government itself had
helped to put the duPont shareholders in their uncomfortable position. By its long delay in bringing the
suit it let many people purchase shares who would not have done so if remedial action had been more
prompt. Id. at 13.
181. The trial court evidently believed that this relief would be as effective as full divestiture. It
certainly was aware that it could be justified on no other grounds:
This does not mean that the private interests of stockholders can outweigh the public interest
in a judgment that will effectively dissipate the effects of the acquisition found to be unlawful,
But it does mean that in the opinion of this Court the primary public purpose should be
achieved so far as possible without inflicting unnecessary injury upon innocent stockholders
in the various corporations involved. The purpose of the decree should be remedial and not
punitive. . . . No harsh and oppressive consequences should be visited upon the
stockholders unless it can be shown on the facts that these results are inescapable ifa decree is
to be framed that will comply with the mandate of the Supreme Court.
177 F. Supp. at 13-14 (citations omitted).
182. Id. at 39, 45.
183. Id. at 39.
184. 366 U.S. 316 (1961).
185. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244, 250-51 (1968) (trial court
"may, if the circumstances warrant, accept a formula for achieving this result by means less drastic than
immediate dissolution or divestiture").
[Vol. 40:779
STRUCTURAL REMEDIES
would not be an effective alternative here. The individuals exercising the
passed-through votes on the GM stock would also be stockholders in
duPont. It would be to their interest to vote for a GM management that
would tacitly continue the favored status for duPont, and so the pass-
through would not necessarily end the improper community of interest
between the two companies.
8 6
Having found the trial court's remedy to be deficient, the Supreme
Court had little difficulty in concluding that full divestiture was necessary:
If the Court concludes that other measures will not be effective to redress a
violation, and that complete divestiture is a necessary element of effective
relief, the Government cannot be denied the latter remedy because economic
hardship, however severe, may result. Economic hardship can influence
choice only as among two or more effective remedies. If the remedy chosen is
not effective, it will not be saved because an effective remedy would entail
harsh consequences. This proposition ... is deeply rooted in antitrust law
and has never been successfully challenged. 7
This decision is even broader than its language would suggest. Like
United Shoe Machinery, it gathers strength and significance from the
nature of the alternative that was rejected. In both cases the position taken
by the trial court had much to recommend it. In duPont, for example, it
hardly seems likely that the scattered individual shareholders could have
coordinated their efforts well enough to actually influence the selection of
General Mbtors directors. 188 Hence it appears that the pass-through
remedy would have worked reasonably well. Similarly, the trial court's
remedy in United Shoe Machinery was working as intended. It had already
reduced United's market share by some twenty-three percent, and, more*
significantly, had led the purchasers of shoemaking machinery to state that
they were satisfied with conditions prevailing in that market. 89 Yet both of
these remedial plans were rejected by the Supreme Court. This suggests
that countervailing concerns-such as stockholders' interests-will prevail
on only rare occasions. That in turn suggests that alternative remedies will
be judged very strictly and will be found wanting if they are even slightly
less effective than full divestiture.
186. 366 U.S. 316, 331 (1961).
187. Id. at 327. For this proposition the Court cited United States v. Crescent Amusement Co.,
323 U.S. 173,189 (1944) ("Those who violate the Act may not reap the benefits of their violations and
avoid an undoing of their project on the plea of hardship or inconvenience"); United States v. Corn
Prods. Ref. Co., 234 F. 964, 1018 (S.D.N.Y 1916), appeal dismissedon motion of appellant, 249 U.S.
621 (1919); United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 188 F. 127, 153 (C.C.D. Del. 1911),
modified, 273 F. 869 (D. Del. 1921); In re Crown Zellerbach Corp., [1957-58] TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) 26,923, at 36,462.
188. Cf. 366 US. at355 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). DuPont's officers and directors would still
remain as a compact bloc and, to the extent that they were members of the duPont family, might own a
considerable number of shares. Under the trial court's decree, however, the shares owned by these
people were "sterilized" and could not be voted at all.
189. The trial court was aware that these firms might simply be reluctant to offend the defendant,
but apparently concluded that their testimony was sufficiently unanimous to have probative value. 266
F. Supp. at 332.
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The Court did not elaborate further on the reasons for its decision in
duPont. It focused on the need for an effective remedy and let the matter
rest at that point. Underlying this result, however, were probably
unarticulated reservations about the actual strength of stockholders'
equitable claims in general. Three grounds for these reservations can be
imagined. First, those persons who bought their stock many years ago, and
saw its value rise in response to a company's profitable antitrust violations,
had no moral claim to retain this increment to its value. They would not
lose anything for which they had paid if this increment were eliminated.
Second, those persons who bought the stock more recently, and paid a
price that already reflected the capitalized value of those violations, had
likewise been done no cognizable injury. Their situation was certainly
more sympathetic than that of the early purchasers, but they had not been
harmed to any greater degree than they would be by an unquestionably
proper conduct order that was also effective in curing the violations.19
Third, it is not empirically clear that stock prices actually decline in
response to a divestiture decree. The earnings of the restructured firm or
firms will presumably be reduced to the extent that supracompetitive
profits are eliminated. Offsetting this, however, is the possiblility of
increased output and increased efficiency-and hence of lower costs and
higher profits-in the more competitive environment that results.'91 These
two factors may balance out in a way that would leave the actual stock
values largely unaffected. 92
Stockholders are the third parties whose claims have most frequently
been considered by the courts. They are not the only such parties, however.
In at least two cases the interests of the general public were cited as a reason
for avoiding certain remedies. In one case the court declined to appoint a
receiver to reorganize a monopolizing corporation, reasoning that this step
190. Indeed, those shareholders may already be exposed under current treble-damage law to
losses considerably greater than would result from a government divestiture action.
191. Cf. LEIBENSTEIN, BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN: A NEw FOUNDATION FOR MICROIECONOMICS
(1976) (managerial slack is one of the most significant costs of monopoly).
192. This analysis does not purport to describe the realities of a divestiture situation. It is merely
intended to show that there is some question about the strength of shareholders' claims. Considerably
more empirical work needs to be done in this area before firm statements can be made. At least three
lines of anecdotal evidence, however, tend to support the proposition given in the text. First, the
reorganizations under the Public Utility Holding Company Act did not significantly affect the relative
value of the various securities involved. See Brodley, Industrial Deconcentration and Legal Feasibllity.
The Efficiencies Defense, 9 J. ECON. ISSUES 365 (1975). See also Blair-Smith & Helfenstein, A Death
Sentence or a New Lease on Life, 94 U. PA. L. REV. 148 (1945); Comment, Section 11(b) of the Holding
Company Act & Fifteen Years in Retrospect, 59 YALE L.J. 1088 (1950). Second, the dissolution or-
dered in Standard Oil was widely predicted to result in a destruction of stock market values. Actually,
however, the stock of Standard Oil of New Jersey advanced by 14 points after the decree was
announced, and it quadrupled in value within the following six years. See P. GIDDEN, STANDARD OIL
COMPANY (INDIANA) 126,136-37 (1956); H. SEAGER & C. GULICK, TRUST AND CORPORATION PROI1LIMS
124 (1929). Third, other sources also indicate that divestiture does not necessarily have undesirable
business consequences. See E. HADLEY, ANTITRUST IN JAPAN (1970) (dissolution of zaibatsus); he
InternationalAspects ofAntitrust Law: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 761 (1979) (statement of Dr. E. Kantzenbach)
(deconcentration in postwar Germany); Baldwin, The Feedback Effect of Business Conduct on
Industry Structure, 12 J. L. & ECON. 169 (1969) (review of 1912 duPont decree).
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might disrupt the flow of goods to the public.19 3 In another case the trial
court refused to order movie distributors to divest themselves of theaters
that they owned. The court believed that the new theater operators would
not be sufficiently experienced to give the public equal service, and noted
that the alternative remedy of a competitive bidding system would be
equally effective in curing the vertical trade restraints. 
94
The interests of still other possible classes of third parties, such as
creditors and employees, do not yet appear to have been invoked as a
reason for denying structural relief. In principle there is no reason why they
could not be considered in that way. 95 Here as elsewhere, however, these
considerations would influence the choice only if an effective alternative
remedy were available.
E. Placement of Defendant in a Special Class
Finally, there is a fifth limitation on the use of structural remedies.
They should not be invoked or framed in a way that places the defendant in
a class separate from his competitors, and outside the ordinary protection
of the laws:
[T]he court may not create, as to the defendants, new duties, prescription of
which is the functon of Congress, or place the defendants, for the future, "in a
different class than other people," as the Government has suggested. The
decree must not be "so vague as to put the whole conduct of the defendants'
business at the peril of a summons for contempt," enjoin "all possible
breaches of the law," or cause the defendants hereafter not "to be under the
protection of the law of the land."' 96
This limitation has much in common with two that were discussed
earlier-the principle that relief should not be punitive, and the principle
that it should not be broader than necessary. Yet the limitation discussed
here is slightly different from each of these. Both of them addressed the
scope of the remedy. They limited, respectively, the purposes that it might
serve and the degree of burden that it might impose. The limitation in this
193. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 186-87 (1911).
194. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 170 (1948). The Paramount
decision is not a wholly reliable precedent. The Supreme Court disagreed with this outcome in two
respects. It thought that the competitive bidding system would involve the courts too deeply in business
matters to be desirable; and it thought the trial court had not considered all possible theories of
economic harm that might result from the defendants' arrangements. Id. at 173-75. The Court
therefore remanded the case for further consideration. In so doing the Court did not expressly hold that
vertical divestiture was required, notwithstanding the possible harm to the general public, but this
appeared to be implicit in the Court's language. The defendants, evidently anticipating this result,
entered a consent decree shortly thereafter in which they agreed to substantial divestiture. See (1948-
49] Trade Cas. 62,335 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). In some senses, however, these later events do not detract
from the proposition stated in the text above. The Supreme Court may have disagreed with the trial
court's assessment of certain factual and economic matters, but it did not appear to disagree, in
principle, with the idea that the interests of the general public should be protected so long as this was
consistent with the selection of an effective remedy.
195. For example, employees may be affected by employment dislocations or by reductions in
pension benefits due to a decline in the value of a firm, and creditors may be adversely affected by a
reduction of the firm's earnings and by increased business risks.
196. Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 409-10 (1945) (footnotes omitted).
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section is concerned with the specific means that a remedy can incorporate.
It establishes the principle that a decree should not utilize specific terms
that have the effect of placing a defendant, for the future, on a different
legal footing from its competitors. A structural decree should instead act as
nearly as possible on a one-time basis and should thereafter withdraw and
allow the firms, within the altered structure, to compete normally with one
another. This goal may be understood, in short, as a variation on the
principle that courts should not become involved more deeply than
necessary' 97 in regulating the day-to-day conduct of a business.
This restriction on the use of structural relief is not particularly
complex, but it can arise in a variety of forms. A few examples may help to
illustrate the situations in which it has been encountered. One decree had
incorporated a conduct injunction to supplement its basic structural
provisions. The injunction prohibited restrictive terms in all future
contracts for the sale or lease of equipment. The Supreme court limited this
order to contracts on the kinds of equipment that had been involved in the
original violation, reasoning that the defendant would otherwise be
competitively disadvantaged in the sale of new or unrelated technology
and would lose his incentive to innovate. 19' In another case the government
sought to require grants of all manufacturing know-how that was
developed over the following three years.' 99 The request was denied on the
theory that it "would reduce the competitive value of the independent
research of the parties. 200 In a third case the trial court had forbidden all
future contracts between members of a dissolved holding company
monopoly. The Supreme Court upheld this term, but only after construing
it as prohibiting anticompetitive contracts only. Otherwise the defendants,
forbidden to conduct certain kinds of ordinary business operations, would
be deprived "of the right to live under the law of the land . ,,20
This limitation on the use of structural relief, like the others, is
nonetheless valid only within certain parameters. Any remedial measure
will apply only to the defendant, after all, and will to that extent subject
him to requirements that others in the industry do not share. Yet all
remedial measures are not on that account improper. The question is one
of drawing lines.
197. The potential costs of this involvement are illustrated by the history of the Paramount
consent decree. Part of that decree regulated industry conduct, and implementation of those terms
reportedly required many years of detailed supervision from the district court.
198. Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 423-24 (1945).
199. United States v. National L,.ad Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947) ("It would discourage rather than
encourage competitive research. It would be contrary to, rather than in conformity with, the policy of
the patent laws now in force.")
200. Id. at 359.
201. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 81 (1911). Similar principles operate under
the consumer-protection half of § 5 also. It has been held improper to enjoin a defendant from all
deceptive advertising in the future, even though he may have utilized deceptive advertising in the past.
This subjects the defendant to contempt punishments forany violation of the law, and thereby exposes
him to exceptional rather than ordinary punishments. See Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 577 F.2d 653,661
(9th Cir. 1978) (concerning F-310 gasoline additive).
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The most obvious line in this area is the one between a remedial term
that directly undoes the effects of an improper act, and a term that goes
further and incorporates additional terms deemed to be desirable. At least
one court has used this line as the basis for determining whether the
"special class" defense would be applicable. 02 In United Shoe Machinery,
defendant had incorporated restrictive terms in all its equipment leases,
and had provided equipment only on lease rather than also offering to sell
it outright. The court included in its order a provision requiring United to
sell its machinery in addition to leasing it. It observed that this provision
was merely corrective "because, through its own action, United has already
put itself in a class different from its competitors. It has used its leases to
monopolize the shoe machinery market. ' 20 3 At the same time, however,
the court denied the government's request for a term that would make
United sales terms more attractive than its leases. "One difficulty with this
proposal is that, instead of redressing the balance between United and its
competitors, it would give a marked advantage to such of United's
competitors as chose to continue leasing machines," 2°4 since lease
arrangements were preferred in the industry.205
One case does not give a particularly solid foundation for describing a
legal principle.20 6 If a tentative generalization may be attempted, however,
it would appear that three rules govern the use of the "special class"
limitation. First, the limitation does not apply to measures that correct or
directly undo an improper act on the part of the defendant. These measures
may be incorporated in the decree even if they have the effect of placing the
defendant in a special legal class. 207 Second, the limitation will apply to the
collateral terms of the decree-terms that are designed, for example, to
affirmatively increase competition rather than to eliminate some barrier to
it. These terms are generally less essential than those covered by the first
point, and so the need for them is not usually sufficiently compelling to
override the policy against creating a special legal status. Third, however,
the special legal status may be used, as can any other remedial device, if
there are no alternatives that will effectively cure the violation. Thus even
the collateral terms of the decree can place the defendant in a special status
if that appears necessary to meaningful relief.
202. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), affd per
curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
203. Id. at 350.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. This is particularly true inasmuch as a later phase of United Shoe Madcinery, reviewing the
progress achieved under the first ten years of the decree, was reversed by the Supreme Court. See 391
U.S. 244 (1968), rev'g 266 F. Supp. 328 (D. Mass. 1967). The Supreme Court held that some unspecified
but more stringent remedial measures were needed to effectively cure the violation, which suggests that
the trial court may have construed its powers too narrowly. Theremas, however, no intimation that this
particular part of the case was wrongly decided.
207. These measures may still be improper according to some other limitation on structural
relief. They may, for example, be more restrictive than is necessary to secure effective relief.
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F. The "Efficiencies Defense"
Some may believe there is a sixth circumstance when structural relief
would be improper. This is the so-called "efficiencies defense." Divestiture
should not be ordered, according to this view, when it would result in a loss
of efficiency and would therefore lead to higher consumer prices.
Efficiency considerations undoubtedly have a place in the
jurisprudence of structural relief. They may be properly relied upon in at
least two circumstances. First, they are an important guide to
prosecutorial discretion. The Commission will not ordinarily seek a
divestiture that will result in consumer losses. Second, they state an
equitable consideration that a court may properly weigh when the remedy
is otherwise in doubt. The Second Circuit in Alcoa observed that if the
matter had been in equipoise it would have let efficiencies tip the
balance. °8
On the other hand, however, efficiency considerations do not
normally rise to the level of an affirmative defense that can preclude a
divestiture that would otherwise be called for. Once a business situation is
found to violate the antitrust laws it is no defense that it results in lower
prices. This theme recurs in many cases. In Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, °9 the Court referred to the congressonal policy of protecting
"viable, small, locally owned businesses," even if this resulted in
"occasional higher costs and prices., 2 0 The Alcoa court referred to a belief
that "great industrial consolidations are inherently undesirable, regardless
of their economic results., 21 The litigation in United States v. Swift &
Co. 2 is particularly instructive. In that case the Supreme Court refused to
modify a consent decree that prohibited the defendants from entering the
grocery business. It did this in large part because the defendants were so
efficient that they would be able to capture most of that market for
208. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 446 (2d Cir. 1945) (unless
necessary to assure competition "it will be a disservice to break up an aggregation which has for so long
demonstrated its efficiency"). See also United States v. American Can Co., 230 F. 859, 903 (D. Md.
1916) ("I am frankly reluctant to destroy so finely adjusted an industrial machine as the record shows
defendant to be.").
209. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
210. Id. at 344.
211. 148 F.2d 416, 428. The Second Circuit elaborated on this thesis in the following terms,
[Congress] did not condone "good trusts" and condemn "bad" ones; it forbad all. Moreover,
in so doing it was not necessarily actuated by economic motives alone. It is possible, because
of its indirect social or moral effect, to prefer a system of small producers, each dependent for
his success upon his own skill and character, to one in which the great mass of those en-
gaged must accept the direction of a few. These considerations, which we have suggested
only as possible purposes of the Act, we think the decisions prove to have been in fact its
purposes.
Id. at 427. Professor Turner, however, while agreeing that language of this kind correctly summnrizcs
the case law, suggests that Congress never explicitly accepted the idea of higher costs as the price of
deconcentration. See Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HAltv. L.
REv. 1313, 1326 (1965).
212. 286 U.S. 106 (1932).
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themselves.213 The significant fact about the "efficiencies defense," in short,
is that it does not exist.
This appears to be true even though some cases have relied heavily
upon the language of efficiency. Upon closer examination those cases are
seen to turn instead on other factors. This is illustrated by the United Shoe
Machinery litigation. The trial court there denied divestiture on the
ground that the defendant's manufacturing facility could not practicably
be divided.214 Although this reasoning seems to invoke considerations of
efficiency, the fact situation in that case was extreme. A single factory was
concerned, and the judge believed that it could not be divided at all, at least
not without a truly radical increase in costs. Thus this case is best classified
as one relating to the practical impossibility of divestiture, rather than as
turning on efficiency considerations per se.
The law's failure to recognize an efficiencies defense is presumably
based on two considerations. First, the antitrust statutes serve social and
political values as well as economic ones, and so the cases do not reflect a
calculus of the economic values alone.2" Second, the efficiencies defense
might be too time-consuming as a practical matter, and so is omitted for
reasons of judicial economy.2 6
G. How Is the Balance Struck?
The last two sections have reviewed the current law on structural
remedies. Section II outlined the circumstances in which structural relief
has been held proper, and the present section has considered the
circumstances in which it is improper. Since this discussion forms the
foundation for the remainder of the article, it may be useful to pause and
review what has been said thus far.
Structural relief is generally justified in five situations: (1) when it will
undo a single improper act, such as a merger or the creation of a holding-
company monopoly; (2) when it will cure an essential element of an
antitrust offense, as in ordinary monopolization; (3) when it will deprive
violators of the fruits of their improper actions; (4) when it will remove the
instrumentalities used in carrying out the violation; and (5) when it will
preclude a recidivism that might otherwise be anticipated.
Structural relief has been found improper in five other situations: (1)
when it is punitive; (2) when less harmful means are available for curing the
213. Id. at 115, 118. See also FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568,579 (1967) (existence
of economies in advertising one reason for finding acquisition unlawful).
214. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295,348 (D. Mass. 1953),afd
per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
215. Nor, of course, do the cases reflect a calculus of social values alone.
216. The potentials for delay inherent in this defense have been mentioned by a number of
commentators. See Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense Revisited, 125 U. PA. L REv. 699
(1977) (suggesting, however, that the defense be recognized in certain limited circumstances); Posner,
Antitrust Policyandthe Supreme Court,75 COLUM. L. Rav. 282,313 (1975). Cf. Department ofiustice
Merger Guidelines, [1977] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 4510.
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violation; (3) when there are practical obstacles to its use, such as
indivisible assets; (4) when it would unduly harm innocent third parties,
such as shareholders of the defendant; and (5) when it would impose upon
the defendant in the future a different legal status than its competitors. The
possible loss of business efficiencies, however, does not state a defense that
will rule out structural relief.
If a particular case falls within just one of these ten categories its
resolution is simple. Structural relief will be either proper or improper
according to the principle governing that category. The matter becomes
more difficult when a case falls within two categories--one suggesting that
structural remedies are appropriate, and the other that they are not. In that
event the negative principle will control. The categories allowing structural
relief are merely permissive, in other words, whereas the categories
forbidding it are mandatory. This is illustrated by virtually all the cases
discussed in the present section. They unquestionably concerned situations
in which structural relief could, in general principle, be granted. National
Lead was part of a successful conspiracy to monopolize, for example, and
United Shoe Machinery was guilty of actual monopolization. Yet certain
kinds of structural relief were denied in both cases, since to grant it would
have violated one of the negative principles.
This rule of priorities is not as confining as it might at first appear to
be. The negative principles may be controlling, but they are also narrower
than their mere enumeration might suggest. They each contain internal
exceptions allowing the use of structural remedies in cases where no other
form of relief would be effective. Thus, the positive and negative principles
are not always in conflict, and the government is never denied a meaningful
remedy.
This is not to say that structural relief is always obtainable. It will not
be ordered in cases where one of the negative principles applies and where
conduct remedies will be able to restore competition. Judges actually,
whether rightly or wrongly, may perceive cases to be the rule rather than
the exception. That is suggested by the results of a study conducted by
Richard Posner.217 Professor Posner examined all the 125 single-firm
monopolization cases brought by the Justice Department between 1890
and 1974. He found that the government obtained some relief in eighty-one
percent of those cases.218 Divestiture, however, was not the usual form of
relief. It was ordered in only twenty-four of the 118 decided cases, 219 and in
only eleven of the eighty-two cases that were brought in the "modern"
period after 1940.220 Even this last figure may overstate the frequency of
structural relief. The eighty-two modern cases include some in which the
monopoly had been brought about in part by merger, and in which divesti-
217. R. POSNER, ANTrrRusT LAW: AN EcoNOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976).





ture would be particularly appropriate. Only sixty-two of those cases dealt
with pure exclusionary practices, unaccompanied by mergers. Of those,
just four ended in substantial22' divestiture, and all four were settled by
consent decree.222 Posner therefore summed up his conclusions as follows:
"I have found no contested case involving exclusionary practices only in
which substantial divestiture was ordered. 223
IV. THE STATUS OF THE CORPORATION AS A "PERSON"
The small number of divestiture orders is somewhat surprising. They
would not, of course, be appropriate in every monopolization case. Still,
however, considering the utility of structural remedies, plus the reasonably
permissive standards for their use, one would expect to find more of them.
There are several possible explanations for this phenomenon. Some
of the cases studied by Professor Posner date from periods when judicial
remedies were less flexible than they are today. Others must have dealt
with situations that conduct remedies would have been perfectly effective
in curing. In still other cases divestiture might actually have been
appropriate, but the judge was left unconvinced by poor trial preparation
on the relief aspects of the case.224 And in some cases the government may
have made its case properly, but was denied a structural remedy as a result
of undue conservatism on the part of the trial judge.225
This section will examine one additional and perhaps more persuasive
explanation for the rarity of structural relief. It suggests that antitrust
practitioners have been unconsciously influenced by the concept of the
corporation as a legal "person." They have therefore tended to think of the
corporation as a normative entity, endowed in the same manner as an
individual person with the right to a continued and undisturbed existence.
This perception appears to be shared by both judges and government
prosecutors. It tends to deter them from seeking or granting structural
relief, since to do so would require the dismemberment-and hence the
"execution"-of the corporate person.
221. Id. at 85. Professor Posner identified "substantial" divestiture in an impressionistic way,
excluding divestitures of minor subsidiaries (e.g., one with sales of $8.5 million) or the dedication of
patents to the public. Id. at 84 n.9.
222. Id. at 85. Consent decrees entail neither an admission nor an adjudication of fault, and so
they are generally considered to be unreliable indications of what the law is. They may have somewhat
more value than is generally assumed, however, since they presumably reflect the judgment of
competent counsel regarding the likely outcome of a trial.
223. Id.
224. Judge Wyzanski's law clerk for United Shoe Machinery later wrote that the government's
proposed remedy was "sketchy, poorly prepared, and failed to come to grips with any of the problems
involved." Kaysen, United States v. United Shoe Machinery, 99 HARV. EcON. STUDIES 343 (1975). See
also Statement ofProfessorJohnJ. Flynn before the National Commission for the Review ofAntitrust
Laws and Procedures (1978) (proceedings on file in offices of the Antitrust Division, United States
Department of Justice).
225. Several commentators have suggested that judges may be overly fearful of the economic
consequences of a "mistake" on their part. See W. SHEPHERD, TilE TREAT-tENr OF MARKET POwER 69
(1975); M. FLEmING, THE PRICE OF PERFECT JUSTICE (1973). In fact, however, business shows great
resiliency in adjusting to changed circumstances.
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This is clearly not a correct interpretation of the law. When courts
have had occasion to squarely address this issue they have uniformly
recognized that the primary interest is that of the defendant's shareholders,
not the conceptual interest of the defendant itself as a corporation. This
appeared most clearly in the duPont litigation:
The effect that a judgment in this case might have upon the lawful interests of
the corporate defendants in their separate corporate capacities is of course a
matter which the Court should consider in framing a judgment, but in the
circumstances of this case it appears to the Court far less important than the
interests of the many thousands of stockholders whose rights are directly
involved.226
The interest of a corporate defendant has been distinguished from that of
its shareholders on a number of other occasions as well. 27
Although courts do not consciously anthropomorphize the corpora-
tion, there is some reason to suspect that they do so subconsciously. The
influence of language on thought is hard to shake, and the structure of our
language is such as to encourage thinking of the corporation as an entity.
We speak of "the corporation," for example; we attribute acts to it; and we
even make it the defendant in our lawsuits. All of this has apparently led to
a certain solicitude for the corporation. Courts frequently speak of the
need to avoid unnecessary harshness in a decree. Yet "harshness" is a
transitive concept, and it is meaningless except in the context of harshness
to something or somebody. The context of these remarks makes it clear
that the courts have been speaking about harshness to the corporation.
This is a concern that can readily lead to a reluctance to impose structural
.remedies. This concern, however, is out of place in the field of antitrust law.
This follows from the juridical nature of the corporation. We think of
the corporation as "a fiction" or as "a legal person." This is not a single
integrated concept, however. It is instead the product of two historically
separate schools of thought: medieval canon law and early English statute
law.228 The first of these strands would justify concern for the corporation
as an entity, but this strand is largely alien to our legal traditions and
should not properly be considered when framing equitable relief. The
second strand is sufficient, and this views the corporation in more
pragmatic and instrumental terms.
The first strand, which views corporations as immortal legal persons,
226. United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 177 F. Supp. 1, 13 (N.D. 111, 1959), revd
on other grounds, 366 U.S. 316 (1961).
227. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 441 (2d Cir. 1945)
(company not responsible for acts of its shareholders); cf. United States v. International Boxing Club,
[1959] Trade Cas. 69,525, at 76,078 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (corporation under new ownership may not have
standing to object to decree against it under prior owners, since the owners were the "real parties in
interest" and were now different).
228. These schools of thought are identified and distinguished in Dewey, The Historic
Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L. J. 655, 665-66 (1926). The discussion in the
text is a preliminary assessment of the subject. This area will require further study before firm
conclusions can be drawn.
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originated with the political needs of the thirteenth-century Church. At
that time Europe was caught up in one of its periodic wars. Beginning with
Frederick Barbarossa, the Hohenstaufen kings, heirs to Charlemagne's
eastern kingdom, were attempting to unite the continent under the Holy
Roman Empire. Their principal opponent was the Papacy, simultaneously
angry at the sight of aggressive war and fearful of the influence it would
lose if the Universal Church were ever confronted by a universal
monarchy. The Popes raised armies for the aid of the nationalist Italian
faction-the Guelphs, as opposed tb the pro-imperial Ghibellines. They
also excommunicated the Hohenstaufens and their adherents. In so doing,
however, it was important that only individual enemies be excom-
municated, and that the organizational structure of the Church be left
intact. Pope Innocent IV therefore propounded the doctrine that
ecclesiastic bodies were enduring and were incapable of punishment. 2 9
They had no independent will, and so could not be excommunicated in
their corporate capacity. Only their individual members could be so
disciplined. Thus the corporation was seen as something of a pure
Aristotelian form. It was nothing more than an intellectual construct,
describing the relationship among a group of individuals, but, precisely
because it was based on the intangible essence of the thing being described,
the construct could not be varied or amended to suit the convenience of the
moment.
The tradition under English law was quite different. It was much less
scholastic and much more utilitarian. The English law, like the Roman law
on which it drew,230 did not identify the corporation as an entity existing in
its own right. Rather, it was a creature of the state. The corporation was
created by concession from the sovereign authority. It therefore had such
powers, and such limitations, as the sovereign saw fit to give it. This
concept of the corporation made political adjustments much easier to
carry out. If the state creates the corporations and defines their powers,
then it is easier to view the corporation as a device, as a tool of convenience,
rather than as a judicial entity. This pragmatic view finds expression in the
early statutes, which imposed a variety of special restrictions on corporate
activities. After the revolution of 1688 the consent of Parliament was
necessary before a company could be granted monopoly privileges.23'
The English perception of the corporation is not only the most
relevant to our own legal tradition,232 but is also the one most conducive to
the use of structural remedies. To the extent that the corporation is a
vehicle of convenience, its form can be freely altered when considerations
229. See INNOCEaNTus IV, COMNMENTARIA lib. V, tit. XXXIX, ch. LII (Frankfurt 1570).
230. The Roman law had well-developed ideas about business associations, functionally similar
to corporations in some respects, but in no law text was such an association referred to as apersona,
and still less as personaficta. See Dewey, supra note 228, at 666-67 n.1 5. Rather, the association was
intimately linked with the individual persons who had created it.
231. See R. FORmEy, TAE HISTORICAL FoUNDATIONSOF MODERN COmPANY LAWv 11-22(1923).
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of convenience require. The corporation, for example, can be divided into
two separate companies. This course would injure the "corporation" as an
entity, but, with the exceptions noted in the next paragraph, that is largely
irrelevant. This course would not significantly harm the stockholder
interests that are the proper object of judicial concern. The stockholders
would still own the same real assets as before. Those assets would simply be
changed into a new form-into the stock of a second company if the
divestiture is made by spinoff, or into cash if it is made by sale. Thus
structural remedies will do no cognizable harm.
This last statement represents the pure theoretical position. It would
have to be qualified somewhat in actual practice. In reality the
shareholders would suffer some actual costs as the result of a corporate
breakup. There would be a transaction cost in carrying out the change; a
possible loss of business efficiency that could diminish the value of the
stock; and a loss of individual freedom in the sense that the shareholders
are deprived of the right to organize their business as they please.233 These
costs may not often be particularly large, but they are certainly real
-enough. This means that a corporation cannot be broken up on a bare
assessment of the marginal utility of that change. The principal point,
however, is that these are costs to the shareholders, not to the corporation.
Concern for the corporation should not have great weight in these cases.
With this observation, the discussion of the current law on structural
relief has been concluded. The remainder of the article will examine ways
in which this law might be altered or expanded. That examination will
begin with the basic policy question of whether any greater use of
structural remedies would be desirable. It is to that question that we now
turn.
V. WOULD A GREATER USE OF STRUCTURAL REMEDIES BE DESIRABLE?
There is much dispute over whether it would be desirable to increase
the use of structural remedies at all. Some believe that this change would
lead to increased competition and lower prices, while others believe that it
would hinder efficiency and thus lead to higher prices. This section will
outline the arguments bearing on that fundamental question.
The considerations dealt with here are primarily economic rather than
legal. They are part of a separate body of learning that has evolved a
considerable literature of its own. A final resolution of this policy question
is therefore beyond the scope of the present article. The article will instead
attempt only to list the principal arguments that have been made for and
232. American jurisprudence has generally followed the English model. This is illustrated by the
pragmatic way in which corporations have been held to be, and not to be, "persons" for various
purposes. Compare Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77 (1938) (corporations are
persons within meaning of due process clause) with Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall,) 168 (1868)
(corporations are not "persons" for purposes of privileges and immunities clause).




against structural remedies and to give some indication of the factors that
should be weighed when reaching a decision.
Increased reliance on structural relief might be favored for several
reasons. First, it may be more likely to be effective. If the new industry
structure contains enough firms to make anticompetitive conduct either
difficult or unlikely of profit, then a defendant would find it hard to engage
in such behavior even if he were prepared to violate the terms of a conduct
injunction.234 Second, a structural remedy may be more difficult to evade.
A company under a specific conduct order is always free to adopt some
alternative anticompetitive practice, with no penalty other than that which
awaits him at the end of a new and separate litigation, but a remedy that
has altered the basic industry structure may effectively preclude a wide
range of undesirable practices. Third, over a time a structural remedy may
be relatively easy to administer. Once in place the remedy should police
itself through natural market forces, and should not later draw the
Commission into the task of monitoring industry conduct. Fourth, a
structural remedy can take effect relatively quickly, whereas it may be
many years before a conduct injunction can restore full competitive
conditions.235 Fifth, and finally, structural remedies may help to advance
the social and political goals that may be a part of the agency's mission.
Such remedies will by definition increase the number of independent firms
in a given industry, and will thereby tend to foster such values as economic
pluralism, dispersion of power, and the creation of institutions of
comprehensible scale.236
234. A great many studies have traced the relationship between industry concentration and firm
profitability. They have generally found a weak but persistent positive correlation. See Veiss, The
Concentration-Profits Relationship and Antitrust, in INDUSTRIAL CONCEN"TRATION: TitE Nev
LEARNING (1974) [hereinafter cited as INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATIoN]. These studies suggest that
reducing industry concentration would tend to increase competition. In a more competitive industry, it
might be more difficult to achieve effective collusion or to exclude or discipline sufficient numbers of
rivals to restore effective market power.
235. See United Statesv. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S, 244,251-52 (1968) (after 10 years, a
conduct order had not restored competition; divestiture then required). Some have suggested that
legally objectionable monopoly situations arise only through exclusionary practices, rather than true
entry barriers, and so can be cured by conduct orders without the need for divestiture. See, e.g., R.
BORK, THE ANrRuST PARADOX 329 (1978). There are two reasons why this conclusion may not be
correct. First, the market power may require a significant time to erode, a possibility Professor Bork
recognizes. Id. at 311. Second, entry barriers may arise through market failures, such as the so-called
"first mover advantage," which prevent the market power from eroding at all. This last concept is
explored in 0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS
216-18 (1975).
236. It should not be thought that this last benefit ofstructural reliefis anew discovery. Some of
the earliest decisions under the Sherman Act have an eerily contemporary ring to them. One of these
cases involved the merits of a Sherman Act claim, rather than the relief to be ordered, but it invoked
many of the same values that are often referred to today by the adovcates of structural remedies.
If it be true that size and power, apart from the way in which they were acquired, or the
purpose with which they are used, do not offend against the law, it is equally true that one of
the designs of the framers of the Anti-Trust Act was to prevent the concentration in a few
hands of control over great industries. They preferred a social and industrial state in which
there should be many independent producers. Size and power are themselves facts some of
whose consequences do not depend upon the way in which they were created or in which they
are used. It is easy to conceive that they might be acquired honestly and used as fairly as men
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This is not to say, however, that there is universal agreement on the
desirability of structural relief. At least four arguments have been made
suggesting that structural relief may be undesirable in some or all cases.
First, structural relief may impose unnecessary transaction costs237 under
circumstances in which conduct injunctions would have been perfectly
effective within a reasonable period of time. Second, it may lead to higher
prices by subdividing firms to a point below the threshold of efficient
size.238 Third, it may penalize innocent third parties such as the creditors or
shareholders of the companies that are reorganized. Finally, it may
diminish the incentive that firms have toward growth and vigorous
239competition.
The following two sections do not attempt to resolve these general
issues. Rather, they assume that structural relief may be an appropriate
remedy in certain specific circumstances. The sections then examine
legal theories that might be applicable in those instances. The first section
will explore the use of structural remedies in conjunction with structural
theories of liability. This discussion will focus specifically on the use of
divestiture as a remedy in no-conduct monopoly actions. The second sec-
tion will then consider whether structural remedies can be legally appro-
priate relief in situations involving collusive conduct among oligopolists.
VI. THE USE OF STRUCTURAL REMEDIES IN CONNECTION WITH
STRUCTURAL THEORIES OF LIABILITY
The use of structural remedies might first be increased in conjunction
with structural theories of liability. These theories would permit a legal
violation to be found solely (or primarily) on the basis of a defendant's
market share. Since the violation in that case would be structural, it would
be simplest and most natural for the relief to be structural as well.
who are in business for the legitimate purpose of making money for themselves and their
associates could be expected to use them, human nature being what it is, and for all that
constitute a public danger, or at all events give rise to difficult social, industrial, and political
problems.
United States v. American Can Co., 230 F. 859, 901 (D. Md. 1916).
237. These are the costs related to changing corporate structures and established patterns of
dealing.
238. Since the scale economies or other efficiencies related to management, research, or access to
capital markets may be difficult to measure, some believe that the prudent course is to assume that
successful companies are successful precisely because they are realizing such efficiencies. See McGee,
Efficiency and Economies of Scale, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION, supra note 234, at 55; R. BORK,
THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 74 (1978). But see Scherer, Economies of Scale and Industrial
Concentration, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION, supra note 234, at 16. Indeed, it has been argued that
whatever correlation exists between industry concentration and firm profits may not reflect a casual
relationship between the two. Rather, both the size and the profitability of the leading firms may be due
to a common third factor, namely their ability to provide superior products at lower prices. See, e.g., R.
BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 192 (1978); Demsetz, Two Systems of BeliefAbout Monopoly, in
INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION, supra note 234, at 164.
239. See K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, THE ANTITRUST PENALTIES 109-11 (1976). For an analysis
indicating that disincentive effects will not be unacceptably great-at least not if divestiture is limited to




The discussion of this approach will be divided into two principal
subsections. The first subsection will examine the legal basis for the
proposed theory. The second subsection will then consider whether such a
purely structural approach is consistent with the limitation of section 5 to
unfair "methods" of competition.
A. The Legal Basis
A structural approach to competition cases would begin with a
structural theory of liability. In other words, liability would be premised
primarily on the defendant's market power. Market power would in turn
be deduced from such circumstances as the defendant's market share,
changes in market shares over time, height of entry barriers, and so forth.
Market power could also be deduced from an inquiry into the defendant's
performance, ascertaining such facts as his rate of profit or (possibly) his
degree of internal inefficiency. Little if any inquiry, however, would be
made into actual conduct.
The structural liability theory that is closest to acceptance is that of
no-conduct monopoly. Under this theory, governmental intervention
would be appropriate, whether or not reprehensible conduct is shown,
whenever substantial and persistent market power exists, unjustified by
patents or efficiencies of scale, and is unlikely to be eroded by market forces
within a reasonable period of time.24°
A no-conduct theory of liability might come into use in a number of
ways. It may be that it is already implicit in the section 2 monopolization
cases, and needs only to be openly articulated.24' Even if not already
present in section 2, moreover, the theory might bejustified under section 5
of the FTC Act as a means of enforcing the spirit of the Sherman Act.
242
Finally, the theory might be established through legislation, as some
current proposals would do.243 This listing is intended only to suggest some
of the possibilities; a full treatment of the legal appropriateness or the
240. See WiUiamson, Dominant Firms and the Monopoly Problem: Aarket Failure
Considerations, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1512 (1972), cited with approval in Statement of Alfred F.
Dougherty before the National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures (1978)
(proceedings on file in offices of the Antitrust Division, United States Department of Justice).
241. Two noted scholars have concluded that this is probably the case. See 3 P. A.EEDA & D.
TURNER, ANrrrRusT LAw 63-64 (1978), At least one lower court has recognized this possibility,
although not attempting to pursue it. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp.295,
343 n.1 (D. Mass. 1953),aff'dpercuriam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). Other caseshave noted, ina similarbut
somewhat less expansive vein, that the burden ofproof may shift to the defendant once thegovernment
shows that he possesses a certain degree ofmarket power. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S.
563, 576 n.7 (1966) (leaving the question open); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America. 148 F.2d
416,427 (2d Cir. 1945) (dictum). But cf. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417,451,
460 (1920) (unexerted market power not an offense).
242. The Sherman Act serves two basic policies: eliminating monopoly power while, at the same
time, preserving competitive incentives. A no-conduct theory of the sort described in the text may well
achieve an appropriate balancing of these two policies in cases of substantial, persistent monopoly
power. For an example of a § 5 case applying the spirit of the Sherman Act in another context, see
Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357, 369-70 (1965).
243. See generally, REPORT OF THENATIONAL COMMISSION FORTHE REvIEW OFANTITRusT LAws
AND PROCEDURES 141-63 (1979).
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economic merits of the no-conduct approach is beyond the scope of this
article.
Assuming that liability has been shown under a structural theory,
such as no-conduct monopoly, then relief would most logically be
structural as well. This approach is justified both by authority and on
principle. It is justified by authority in the sense that it is analogous to the
merger and holding-company monopoly cases that were discussed in a
previous section.244 The merger cases used divestiture to undo an improper
acquisition; the holding-company cases used it to dissolve an improperly-
formed cartel; and the remedy here would use it to terminate an improper
monopolistic situation. In each case, in short, the divestiture would be used
to directly undo a structural violation of the antitrust laws.
Structural relief would be justified on principle as well as on authority.
A remedy must correct the essential elements of the offense at which it is
directed. To the extent that the theory of violation was based solely or
primarily on the defendant's market power, only a remedy that reduces
that power will address the essential elements of that offense. Changes in
an industry's structure will often have the intended effect, but changes in
conduct may affect market power only after a period of years, if at all, and
for that interval would leave an adjudicated law violation in full and
245uncorrected existence. Relief that merely changed some aspects of a
firm's performance-such as its prices or profit rates--would also be open
to objection. Such measures could indeed take effect at once and could, in
theory, offset the consequences of a bad structural situation. Judicial
regulation of this sort is apt to be administratively unfeasible, however,
and would require a greater intrusion into market mechanisms than would
be wise.246 Hence, the relief under a structural no-conduct theory is best
confined to adjustments in the market structure that was the original
source of the violation.
The "pure" situation described in the previous pages will become
somewhat more complicated as conduct evidence comes to play a larger
role in the theory of liability. Presumably some slight element of conduct
can be shown without altering the basically structural nature of the action.
Relief would still have to be structural to address the central elements of
244. See text accompanying notes 45-60 supra.
245. The slow pace at which conduct injunctions may change market structure is illustrated by
the United Shoe Machinery litigation. See text accompanying notes 76-86 supra. It is illustrated even
more strikingly by the litigation surrounding IBM's manufacture of tabulating cards. In 1936 the
Supreme Court affirmed an order enjoining IBM from tying the purchase of these cards, in which
market IBM held 81%, to the lease of its calculating equipment. IBM v. United States, 298 U.S. 131
(1936). This relief proved ineffective, and IBM signed a consent decree in 1956, providing for divesti-
ture unless its share of the marketfell below50%. See IBM v. United States, [1956] Trade Cas. 58,245
(S.D.N.Y.). Conduct relief failed to reduce the market share to the stipulated level, and after seven
years-nearly 30 years after the original decree-divestiture was finally ordered. See United States v.
IBM, [1963] Trade Cas. 8824.46 (S.D.N.Y.).
246. This approach may also be undesirably indirect. Persistently high profits, for example, are
likely to be a symptom of some underlying competitive problem, which may be best cured by
addressing it directly. Regulation may only be preferable in cases of true natural monopolies,
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the offense. Beyond a certain point, however, the conduct elements may
become so important that conduct-oriented injunctions would become a
valid alternative form of relief.247 In that event the case can no longer be
treated as one resting on purely structural theories, and relief will have to
be selected in accordance with the principles described in the following
section on remedies for conduct violations.
The exact point at which the legal theory changes its character is not
clear. For present purposes, however, it is probably unnecessary to resolve
that issue. It is sufficient to note that there exists a spectrum of liability
theories, some of which are clearly structural. As to them, at least,
structural remedies will be appropriate.
B. Authority Under Section 5
Even if appropriate on general principle, however, pure structural
cases may not be authorized under the specific mandate of section 5.
That statute declares "unfair methods of competition" to be unlawful, and
empowers the Commission to enjoin them. 24It will be observed that this
language speaks only of "methods" of competition, which suggests a ban
on improper actions rather than on undesirable structure. The purely
structural case may therefore be outside the scope of section 5.
This argument, while probably not, as will be shown below, the best
reading of the statute, was recently made by a commentator relying
primarily on the original legislative debates.249 Those debates, the
commentator argued, indicate a conscious intention to limit section 5 cases
of anticompetitive conduct.250 In the view of the legislators it was
unnecessary to address structural problems directly. Bad structure could
be brought about only by bad conduct and, as a result, if conduct were kept
within fair limits the industrial structure would remain competitive and
self-policing.
This interpretation does have substantial support in the legislative
record. The final report of the House Conference Committee, for example,
which was quoted in an earlier section, deserves to be repeated in this
context: "It is now generally recognized that the only effective means of
establishing and maintaining monopoly, where there is no control of a
natural resource as [or?] of transportation, is the use of unfair competition.
The most certain way to stop monopoly at the threshold is to prevent
unfair competition. 25' Senator Hollis, a frequent participant in the
247. This may be true, for example, when the theory of liability stated that a certain kind of
exclusionary conduct was improper if engaged in by a dominant firm.
248. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (Supp. 11977).
249. Kruse, Deconcentration and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Comnission Act, 46 GSo.
WAsH. L. REv. 200 (1978). A similar conclusion is reached in 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUSr
LAw 306 (1978), although without extensive analysis.
250. Kruse, supra note 249, at 211-20.
251. H. R. CONF. REP. No. 1142, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 18-19, reprinted in 51 CoNo. REc. 14924
(1914). Even this language may not weigh heavily against the structural case. Conduct orders may have
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legislative discussions, spoke in a similar vein: "Without the use of unfair
methods no corporation can grow beyond the limits imposed upon it by
the necessity of being as efficient as any competitor. ' 25 2 J. B. Clark, a
leading economist of the day and a witness at the congressional committee
hearings, also believed that a ban on unfair competitive methods would be
sufficient to ensure competitive conditions. If small firms were free from
fear of predatory retaliation, they could compete effectively, in his opinion,
and the threat of losing market share would at least force the major firms to
price at a level that would not attract new entry.25a Hence, section 5 could
be read literally, and could be held to reach only active "methods" of
competition, without generally disappointing the expectations of its
original sponsors.
Similar beliefs appear in early case law. In the original Standard Oil
decision, the following passage appears: "Monopoly would inevitably be
prevented if no extraneous or sovereign power imposed it and no right to
make unlawful contracts having a monopolistic tendency were per-
mitted. 254
The early history does not tell the entire story, however. The
subsequent case law has expanded the role of section 5 beyond the
approach that may have first been contemplated. Six lines of authority
now make it reasonably clear that structural cases will be permissible
under section 5. Those arguments will be reviewed below, albeit only in a
skeletal and preliminary fashion.
The first point to be made is that the statutory reference to "methods"
of competition does not have an independent substantive significance. It
does not imply a conduct-oriented rather than structural case. As section 5
was originally drafted it referred only to "unfair competition." A number
of Senators observed that the phrase already had a recognized and limited
meaning at common law-that of passing off the goods of one company as
the products of another. Senator Reed feared that this precedent would
jeopardize the future of the new section 5:
It is my opinion that if we employ the term "unfair competition" as it is
employed in this bill, without adding anything to it, the courts will adopt as
the meaning of Congress that meaning which has been affixed to the term by
all of the law dictionaries and by a great many legal authorities. 255
been contemplated in order to keep a monopoly from coming into being, but structural orders may still
be appropriate in dealing with those that already exist; the conduct order alone may be too slow in
effecting a cure.
252. 51 CONG. REC. 12146 (1914) (remarks of Sen. Hollis).
253. See J. B. CLARK & J. M. CLARK, THE CONTROL OF TRusTs 27 (2d ed. 1912); cf. W, WILSON,
THE NEW FREEDOM 201-16 (1913). For other indications that § 5 contemplated only conduct violations,
rather than structural ones, see 51 CONG. REC. 11455 (1914) (remarks of Sen. Newlands); Id. at 12732
(remarks of Sen. Hughes).
254. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911). If a monopoly were established,
however, the Standard Oil Court would be willing to use structural remedies in order to cure it, For a
general discussion of early thinking on monopoly policy, concluding that the Sherman Act was first
visualized as reaching trade restraints rather than structure, see United States v. United Shoo Mach,
Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 341 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'dper curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
255. 51 CONG. REc. 12936 (1914) (remarks of Sen. Reed).
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The solution to this problem was proposed by Senator Hollis:
If the junior Senator from Missouri is right in his claim that the words
"unfair competition" . . . [are] applicable only to cases of the substitution
of one man's goods for another's ...I suggest . . .that the words
"unfair" and "competition" be separated by some word that will not do them
any harm, such as "oppressive" or "methods of" so that there will not be a
particular label that has been attached in many cases ....26
An amendment to this effect was eventually adopted.2 " The circumstances
of its adoption thus make clear that the reference to "methods" of
competition was intended to broaden, not narrow, the reach of section 5,
and in particular did not create any limitation to active conduct.
This leaves us then with the word "competition." Does the original
phrase, "unfair competition," have any similar implication of active
conduct? A second line of argument would suggest not. The Congress may
indeed have expected that conduct orders would be sufficient to achieve the
Commission's objectives. Congress may not have thought that a monopoly
could exist that was neither maintained by exclusionary conduct nor
justified by true superior efficiency. Such a situation was apparently not
commonly or ever recognized by the economic knowledge of the day. But
Congress certainly did not affirmatively forbid a challenge to such
monopolies if they were ever encountered. Congress' ultimate concern was
with the public interest and with the elimination of unjustified monopoly
power. Senator Cummins, one of the principal sponsors of the FTC Act,
observed that there "can be unfair competition in which the public is
interested without any [bad] intent . . . ...2 Our reading of the statutory
term should therefore reflect this underlying purpose.
A third argument would refer to the line of cases discussed in the
opening section of this article. They held that the Commission's remedial
power includes the use of divestiture and other structural remedies. This is
so even though section 5 technically authorizes only the issuance of"an
order requiring such [respondent] to cease and desist . . . ,"59 The
Commission was intended to cure a range of competitive ills, and
"Congress must have intended to give it authority that was ample to deal
with the evils at hand. 260 When divestiture is necessary to correct the
problem, therefore, the power to order it will be implied in even the
conduct-oriented remedial provisions of section 5.
The Commission's substantive powers, like its remedial ones, are
phrased in conduct-oriented terms. The Commission is directed to prevent
unfair "methods" of competition. Since this provision appears in the same
statutory section as the authorization for cease and desist orders, it would
256. Id. at 12145 (remarks of Sen. Hollis).
257. See H. R. CONF. REP. No. 1142, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914).
258. 51 CONG Rc. 13311 (1914) (remarks of Sen. Cummins).
259. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (b) (Supp. 11977).
260. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 312 (1963) (construing
analogous provisions of CAB statute).
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be most logical to give the two parts of section 5 a consistent construction
and hold that both contemplate the possibility of structural litigation. A
theory of liability based solely on industry structure should also be proper
under section 5.
A fourth line of cases holds that section 5 will reach all violations of
the letter of the Sherman Act. This is so even though the legislative history
quoted above might seem to suggest different coverages for these two
statutes.261 Some commentators have suggested that section 2 of the
Sherman Act will support both a theory of no-conduct monopoly and the
act-of-monopolization theories that are presently used.262 If such a case
can be brought under section 2, therefore, it can also be brought under
section 5.
A fifth line of cases holds that section 5 can be used to reach conduct
that is generally similar to a Sherman Act violation, but that does not come
within its literal terms. The conduct may constitute an incipient violation
of the Sherman Act,263 or it may violate the underlying spirit of the Act.
264
In either case it can be reached under section 5. To the extent that a
structural liability theory can be cast in either of these terms, therefore, it
will again come within the scope of the FTC Act.265
A sixth line of authority appears in scholarly commentary, but does
not seem, as yet, to have been adopted by the courts. The commentators
point out that an action under section 5 is inherently less damaging to a
respondent than an action under the Sherman Act. Criminal penalties are
not imposed, for example, nor are treble damages. The Commission,
moreover, is limited by its obligation to advance the general interests of the
public rather than the parochial interests of a private litigant. For these
reasons it should be fair to recognize a wider range of violations under
section 5 than would be proper under conventional antitrust statutes. 2
66
This principle may also help the Commission to justify the use of structural
theories of liability.
VII. THE USE OF STRUCTURAL REMEDIES IN CONNECTION WITH
CONDUCT THEORIES OF LIABILITY
The use of structural remedies is most clearly appropriate in
261. See, e.g., FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 690 (1948).
262. See 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 91614-23 (1978). Areeda and Turner first
point out that the language of § 2 does not necessarily preclude a no-conduct theory. Although the
statute uses the active voice in condemning corporations that "monopolize," this requirement for
conduct might be satisfied by showing any affirmative business act, such as the making of sales, rather
than an act that is specifically exclusionary. The authors then conclude, for policy reasons, that a no-
conduct theory should actually be adopted by the courts, subject to various defenses.
263. Fashion Originator's Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 466 (1941).
264. Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357, 369-70 (1965).
265. Even if the Areeda and Turner thesis described in note 262 supra is not accepted-and the
Sherman Act is not held to directly incorporate a theory of no-conduct monopoly-such a theory
might still be justified as one based on the underlying spirit of that Act.
266. See 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 1 307b-307f(1978). The basic "fairness"
to respondents should be emphasized, since the absence ofethical or due process difficulties will make it
easier to resolve an ambiguous statute in the direction of broader coverage.
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conjunction with structural theories of liability. Divestiture will sometimes
also be warranted, however, in response to liability established under the
more familiar conduct theories. This use of the structural remedy may
actually prove to be the more important of the two, since conduct cases are
apt to considerably outnumber those, if any, that are brought on purely
structural grounds.
Within certain limits this is already the law. Conduct violations of
certain specialized types have already been held to justify divestiture. The
doctrine depriving defendants of the fruits of their violations is one
instance of this approach, for example, and the doctrine allowing
structural relief in the case of recidivists is another.
There may also be another and more common circumstance in which
the structural remedy would be appropriate. That is the situation of
collusion among oligopolists. Although this particular offense involves
conduct, conduct injunctions may not be adequate to cure it in every case.
The ordinary conduct remedies for collusion are injunctions, criminal
sanctions, and treble damages. Under current practice, however, those
sanctions may not be fully effective deterrents to future collusion.267 A
structural remedy may prove to be more effective. Not only does it have a
deterrent value, but it may also reduce the firms' inherent power to collude
in the future.
Conduct injunctions are sometimes too narrow, and members of the
oligopoly will remain able to continue colluding through the use of some
mechanism other than the one that was discovered and enjoined, or they
may resort to the more subtle devices used to facilitate tacit collusion.26" A
divestiture order may make such a continuation more difficult. By
deconcentrating the industry it will increase the number of firms, thereby
making coordination among them more difficult and successful collusion
less likely.269 Moreover, in addition to ending an artificial restraint upon
competition, the divestiture remedy may go further and succeed in
affirmatively increasing it. Hence, structural remedies may be necessary in
order to secure the most effective relief.
270
267. See K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, THE ANTITRUST PENALTIES (1976).
268. Some of the many possible mechanisms for accomplishing this end are listed In a Justice
Department memorandum, A SECTION 1 APPROACHI TO SHARED MONOPOLY PROSECUTION-
FACILITATION DEVICES, CCH TRADE REG. REP. No. 345 (August 8, 1978). These same devices may also
tend to result in supracompetitive prices without any actual agreement or conspiracy.
269. One's acceptance of this point will be influenced to some extent by one's view of the
economic debate outlined above in section V supra. It should be noted, however, that the point being
made here is not precisely the same as the one outlined above. The economic debate considered
whether, in general, supracompetitive pricing could be reliably predicted in concentrated industries.
Here, however, we have a situation where collusion has actually been found. Hence, a certain
predisposition toward it can now be fairly assumed, and the remedies adjusted accordingly.There have
been some judicial decisions, moreover, that seem to accept the basic argument that reducing
concentration may increase competition. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321,
363 (1963) ("Competition is likely to be greatest where there are many sellers, none of which has any
significant market share."). Indeed, much of our antitrust legislation may be said to rest on this
premise.
270. Structural relief would not necessarily be the most effectivein every case.The need forsuch
relief would be greatest when the defendants possess significant market power. This would, of course,
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On the basis of these considerations one could conclude that
structural relief would be the best remedy for a particular case of collusion
among oligopolists. 271 If so, then a series of well-established precedents
would justify the imposition of that remedy as a legal matter. It is clear,
first of all, that whatever relief is decreed in a given case must be effective.272
To assure this, another line of cases states that the government, having
sustained the burden of proof on the violation, is entitled to have all d oubts
on the remedy resolved in its favor.273 This would tend to support the use of
structural decrees because they will almost always work. The resulting
remedy should also be one that minimizes the need forjudicial supervision,
which again suggests a preference for structural remedies.274 The Supreme
Court, although often expressing deference to the trial court's selection of
a remedy, 275 has not hesitated to revise decrees to include divestiture terms
when it thought they were necessary.276
Once the Commission has decided on the need for a structural remedy
in accordance with this line of reasoning, the propriety of actually ordering
it would appear to be reasonably clear. The circumstances for denying
structural relief-discussed above in section II [-will generally be
inapplicable. Only one of them may still have some relevance. The
divestiture should be no more drastic or sweeping than an effective remedy
requires. The remaining grounds for denying structural relief, however,
be assessed in light of concentration ratios, stability of market shares over, time, entry barriers, and
similar factors. Cf. text accompanying notes 283-84 infra.
271. For a differing view, see K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, TuE Ar.rrTUST PENALTIES (1976).
272. See Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562,573 n.8 (1972) (remedy should "cure the
ill effects of the illegal conduct, and assure the public freedom from its continuance"), quoting United
States v. United States Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76,88 (1978); United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours &
Co., 366 U.S. 316, 326 (1961) ("courts are authorized, indeed required, to decree reliefeffective to cure
the violation"). See also International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392,401 (1947); United States
v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1947).
273. See United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 366 US. 316, 334 (1961) ("it is well
settled that once the Government has successfully borne the considerable burden of establishing t
violation of law, all doubts as to the remedy are to be resolved in its favor"). See also Hartford-Empire
Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 286, 409 (1945).
274. See United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 330-31, 333-34 (1961)
("the publicinterest should not in this case be required to depend upon the often cumbersome and time.
consuming injunctive remedy"). See also United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131,163
(1948) ("control through the power of contempt is crude and clumsy") (although executing the terms of
even that decree placed a considerable burden on the trial court); United States v. Crescent Amusement
Co., 323 U.S. 173, 186, 189-90 (1944); United States v. United Shoe Mitch. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295,
349-51 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'dper curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954); United States v, Pullman Co., 50 F.
Supp. 123, 136 (E.D. Pa. 1943), aff'dbyan equally divided Court, 330 U.S. 806(1947); UnitedStates v,
Corn Prods. Ref. Co., 234 F. 964,1018 (S.D.N.Y. 1916) (conduct injunction undesirable because of the
"difficulties of proof, the delay, the cumbersome inquiry necessary to ascertain again whether the
defendants shall have actually discontinued" the practices).
275. See Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562,573 (1972); International Boxing Club
v. United States, 358 U.S. 242, 253 (1959); United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 334
(1947).
276. See United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316,323 (1961) ("we have a
duty ourselves to be sure that a decree is fashioned which will effectively redress proved violations of the
antitrust laws"). See also United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 185-86 (1944). Blt
cf. United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 371-79 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
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such as harm to shareholders or the presence of practical obstacles to its
use, all contain exceptions allowing such relief when it is thought necessary
to cure the violation. The present situation is one in which such a finding
will have been made. As a result, structural remedies should generally be
held appropriate.
This is illustrated by the Paramount Pictures2 77 litigation. In that
case the district court had found a variety of anticompetitive practices on
the part of producers, distributors, and exhibitors of motion pictures. The
practices included such things as block booking, unreasonable delays
before second-run release, conspiracies, and attempts to monopolize. They
did not, however, include actual monopolization.278 The district court
dealt with these conduct-related offenses by means of a conduct-related
decree, which basically required a system of open competitive bidding for
future film releases.279 The Supreme Court, however, rejected this remedy
on the ground that it would involve the courts too deeply in business
decisions. 280 The Court, significantly, did not then remand the case for
construction of some different conduct decree. It instead indicated that
divestiture was "an alternative" to the decree, thus strongly intimating that
an order along those lines would be proper.28' Thus, it appears that the
Court contemplated divestiture as a remedy for what was basically a
conduct offense.282
An action along these lines would be designed, ideally, to
deconcentrate an industry to a point at which interdependent behavior
becomes improbable. The case would aim to bring the industry's
concentration ratio down below some critical value. This then leads to an
important operational question: Is there a "tipover point" in terms of
concentration below which collusive conduct is improbable?
The data on this question is ambiguous, and few researchers will claim
to have arrived at a fully satisfactory solution.283 Some of the estimates
277. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
278. Id. at 168. The Supreme Court remanded the case for, among other things, a determination
regarding whether there may have been actual monopolization in certain specialized submarkets. Id. at
172-73. This aspect of the case is not important for present purposes. The discussion that follows,
dealing with the alternatives of conduct and divestiture remedies, was described by the Court as "an
independent reason" for remand. Id. at 174.
279. Id. at 161.
280. Id. at 162-63.
281. Id. at 175. The divestiture would separate the major film studios from the theaters that they
owned-an ownership that appeared to underlie many of the preferential dealing arrangements found
to exist. The district court had considered divestiture as an alternative to the competitive bidding
system, but declined to order it until the latter approach had been tried and found %vanting. 334 U.S. at
170.
282. In some respects the Paramount case may be a narrower precedent than it first appears. The
restrictive practices and the divestitures there were both primarily vertical, and so the decision may be
confined to those circumstances rather than establishing a general rule in favor of structural remedies.
This seems relatively unlikely. Nothing in the Court's opinion suggests an affirmative intention to
restrict the holding, and if vertical restraints will justify vertical divestiture, then horizontal restraints
should at least justify horizontal divestiture.
283. One summarized the work in the field as follows:
Mhough I produced reams and reams of printout and struggled and struggled and struggled,
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that have been made, however, are consistent within a reasonably narrow
range. Professor Bain's original study seemed to show a critical four-firm
ratio of fifty percent and an eight-firm ratio of seventy percent.284 A more
recent project suggested somewhat lower figures of forty-five and sixty
percent, respectively. 285 Thus, while far from definitive, these studies
would suggest a reasonable target for enforcement efforts.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The subject of structural remedies is basic to the development of a
sound litigation strategy. The remedial phase is an integral part of any
antitrust suit. To the extent that divestiture is necessary to the proper
resolution of a case, therefore, it should be litigated from the beginning
with an eye to those facts relevant to a structural remedy.
The law on structural remedies is, unfortunately, as sprawling and ill-
defined as it is important. Only the high points of the previous discussion
can be recorded here. It appears first that divestiture is a remedy that is
available to the Federal Trade Commission even though the agency's
power is formally limited to the issuance of "cease and desist" orders.
Divestiture has been upheld in a number of specific contexts including
cases in which it would cure an essential element of the antitrust offense or
in which it would deprive a defendant of the fruits o:r instrumentalities of
his violation. Structural remedies have been disapproved where some less
harsh form of relief was available and would have been equally effective.
The concept of "equal effectiveness" is crucial, however, and in many
circumstances it can be argued that only divestiture will be reasonably
certain of restoring competitive conditions. This argument is bolstered by
the fact that at the relief hearing the government is entitled to have all
doubts resolved in its favor. Armed with this authority the Commission
might consider the expanded use of structural remedies in certain
situations. It might seek the remedy not only in connection with the
I was never able to come to a convincing solution, and I don't think I have seen a convincing
solution. . . . I just don't have any confidence in their details. I do have confidence that,
over a wide range, reducing concentration would reduce price-cost margins.
Weiss, from a dialogue reported in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION, supra note 234, at 243.
284. See Bain, Relation of Profit-Rate to Industry Concentration: American Manufacturing,
1936-1940, Q. J. ECON., Aug. 1951, at 65. Similar figures were discovered by White, who found a
critical four-firm ratio of 57%. See White, Searchingfor the Critical Industrial Concentration Ratio, in
J. GOLDFELD & R. QUANT, STUDIES IN NONLINEAR ESTIMATION (1976). Other investigators found the
critical four-film ratio to be 51%. See Rhoades & Cleaver, The Nature ofthe Concentration-Price/ Cost
Margin Relationship for 352 Manufacturing Industries: 1967, 40 S. ECON. J. 90-102 (1973).
285. See Dalton & Penn, The Concentration-Profitability Relationship: Is There a Critical
Concentration Ratio?, 25 J. INDUS. ECON. 133, 137 (1976). This study was based solely on firms In the
food industry, however, due to the availability of more accurate data there. Id. at 136. A more recent
study by the FTC's Bureau of Economics examined newly-available data on two-firm concentration
ratios. It concluded that price-cost margins increased significantly once the two largest firms controlled
35% of the market. This report suggests that the two-firm ratio is a more reliable predictor of
anticompetitive conditions than the four-firm ratio, which in turn suggests that relatively few
competitors are needed to keep an industry performing well. See J. KWOKA, MARKET SIIARES,
CONCENTRATION, AND COMPETITION IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES (1978).
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traditional monopoly action, but also in connection with structural
theories of liability or with conduct theories of liability in oligopolistic
industries. If divestiture is needed to cure those violations, the Commission
should have the authority to require it. The chances of success in each of
these areas will be increased to the extent that the Commission can purge
the law of the concept that the corporation is a legal "person."
In considering an expanded use of structural remedies, the
Commission should act with care and circumspection, mindful of the risks
involved. This caution has appeared in earlier decisions:
In the antitrust field the courts have been accorded, by common consent, an
authority they have in no other branch of enacted law . . . . They would
not have been given, or allowed to keep, such authority in the antitrust field,
and they would not so freely have altered from time to time the interpretation
of its substantive provisions, if courts were in the habit of proceeding with the
surgical ruthlessness that might commend itself to those seeking absolute
assurance that there will be workable competition, and to those aiming at
immediate realization of the social, political, and economic advantages of
216dispersal of power.
At the same time, however, the Commission should remember the
ultimate goal of the antitrust laws. Those laws are concerned with
maintaining effective competition in the public interest. A violation of
those laws must be effectively redressed in order to serve the public interest.
The public is entitled to no less:
The key to the whole question of an antitrust remedy is of course the
discovery of means effective to restore competition . . . . [Clourts are
authorized, indeed required, to decree relief effective to redress the violations,
whatever the adverse effects of such a decree on private interests. Divestiture
is itself an equitable remedy designed to protect the public interest.2 7
286. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295,348 (D. Mass. 1953),aff'dper
curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
287. United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 326 (1961).
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